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Reading Section 230
SHLOMO KLAPPER †
In Gonzalez v. Google, the Supreme Court, for the first
time, agreed to hear a case concerning the interpretation of
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the most
important law governing the internet. As Justice Thomas and
others have noted, judges have overlooked Section 230’s text
in interpreting the statute, relying instead on purpose. Yet
scholars and critics, too, have eschewed the statutory text,
relying on intent or consequences to favor alternate
interpretations, but depriving the Court and litigants of the
richness the statutory text offers.
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of
Section 230’s text and structure. Section 230 means what it
says: it excludes from its protection entities that act as
publishers rather than intermediaries; treats, by default, all
intermediaries as distributors; and offers extra protection to
certain intermediaries—“Computer Good Samaritans”—who
actively clean up certain categories of objectionable content on

† Yale Law School, J.D., 2020. For helpful comments and conversations, the
author is grateful to Jack Balkin, Patrick Barry, Sam Bray, Greg Dickinson, Josh
Divine, Michael Francus, Raji Gururaj, Ben Johnson, Jeff Kosseff, Ela Leshem,
Asaf Lubin, Myles Lynch, Steven Menashi, Avi Menter, Christina Mulligan, Lee
Otis, Soren Schmidt, Ben Silver, Chaya-Bracha Walkenfeld, Evan Zoldan, and
the participants at the 2022 Federalist Society Junior Scholars Colloquium.
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the internet.
This Article has significant implications. It finds that
judges have consistently misinterpreted Section 230;
therefore, judges should alter the main doctrinal inquiries for
whether Section 230 immunity attaches, the entities to which
it attaches, and the nature of that immunity. This Article also
informs current political debates because Section 230 already
incorporates the substance of many proposed reforms: Section
230 does not need to be reformed or re-written, only re-read.
And this Article contributes to the current scholarly
reconceptualization of textualism and suggests a new avenue
of research: the intersection between inequality and
interpretation.

2022]

READING SECTION 230

1239

CONTENTS
CONTENTS ......................................................................... 1239
INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1240
I. SECTION 230: GENESIS, INTERPRETATION, CRITIQUE .... 1245
A. Genesis: “Computer Good Samaritans” ............ 1246
B. Interpretation: Purposivism’s Dominance ........ 1252
C. Critique: Intentionalism and
Consequentialism .............................................. 1256
II. READING SECTION 230 ................................................. 1263
A. Zeran’s Error: Revisiting Subsections (c)(1)
and (c)(2)........................................................... 1264
B. Where Section 230 Does Not Apply ................... 1274
C. Section 230(c)(1) ................................................ 1280
1. “Publisher or speaker” .................................. 1282
2. Distributor Liability..................................... 1285
D. Section 230(c)(2)(A) ........................................... 1290
1. Section 230(c)(2) Immunity Only Attaches
in the Narrow Circumstances Outlined by
Statute .............................................................. 1291
2. Section 230(c)(2) Only Applies to“Good
Faith” Efforts to Moderate .............................. 1304
3. Section 230 Applies When There is a Nexus
Between the Cause of Action and the Content
Moderation ........................................................ 1310
E. Section 230(c)(2)(B) ........................................... 1313
III. IMPLICATIONS: DOCTRINE, POLITICS, SCHOLARSHIP... 1317
A. Doctrine: Reorienting Section 230 Immunity ... 1318
1. Unresolved Doctrinal Questions.................. 1318
2. Changing the Doctrine ................................. 1321
B. Politics: Section 230 Is Already Reformed ........ 1326
C. Scholarship: Interpretation & Inequality ......... 1329
CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 1330

1240

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

INTRODUCTION
In October 2022, the Supreme Court granted the petition
for certiorari in Gonzalez v. Google, agreeing, for the first
time, to hear a case regarding the interpretation of
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 1
Section 230 is the most important law governing the
internet. 2 YouTube, Facebook, Reddit, Wikipedia,
Twitter, eBay, Snapchat, Google, Yahoo, Amazon,
TikTok—the websites and apps that govern so much of
our lives—arguably owe their existence to Section 230. 3
This is because these websites rely on content from third
parties. Section 230, in turn, immunizes these
intermediaries from lawsuits based on third-party
content. 4 For instance, if someone authors a defamatory
diatribe on Facebook, Facebook is not liable for the post,
security intermediaries (like CloudFare) or cloud
computing platforms (like Amazon Web Services) are not
liable for providing backend services, and broadband
providers (such as Fios or Comcast) are not liable for
permitting the traffic to flow through their networks. 5
1. Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333, 2022 WL 4651229 (U.S. Oct. 3,
2022). The lower court decision is Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871 (9th Cir.
2021).
2. See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE
INTERNET 3 (2019); CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited
June 9, 2022). See also Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech
Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2313 (2014) (“Section 230 immunity . . . ha[s]
been among the most important protections of free expression in the United
States in the digital age.”).
3. KOSSEFF, supra note 2, at 4.
4. See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 427, 433 (2009).
5. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011,
2037–40 (2018) (reviewing the three different parts of the internet “stack,”
namely “basic internet services”—such as hosting services, the Domain Name
System, broadband companies, and caching services—“payment services”—”such
as MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal”—and “content curators”); see, e.g., Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that GTE was not liable for an illegal
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Recently, Section 230 has become the focus of bipartisan
ire and widespread controversy. 6 The left blames Section 230
for immunizing the spread of harmful misinformation. 7 The
right blames Section 230 for providing platforms carte
blanche to censor conservative content or de-platform
whomever they wish, even a sitting President. 8 In opposition,
Section 230’s defenders argue that the statute has done more
good than harm, and that any proposed alternatives would
be unconstitutional, calamitous, or both. 9 This debate,
unsurprisingly, is premised on the judiciary’s extraordinarily
broad interpretation of Section 230. 10
Yet this debate—and the judicial opinions on which it is
based—have been conducted without the input of the
statutory text. 11 In applying the law, judges have relied on
purpose to apply the law. 12 Meanwhile, scholarly
commentators have relied mostly on intention and
consequences to argue for alternate interpretations. 13 The

video); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that AOL
was not liable for a defamatory statement posted by an AOL user).
6. See Gregory M. Dickinson, The Internet Immunity Escape Hatch, 47 BYU
L. REV. 1435, 1436–37 (2022).
7. See infra notes 93–100 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 373–88 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, How Section 230 Reform Endangers
Internet
Free
Speech,
BROOKINGS
(July
1,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-section-230-reform-endangersinternet-free-speech (“Some of these proposals [to reform Section 230] are not
intended to become law. If they did, the courts would likely strike some down as
violations of the protections for freedom of speech guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution’s First Amendment.”); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes,
The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 410 (2017) (“Section 230’s most fervent supporters argue
that it is ‘responsible for the “extraordinary Internet boom’’’ and its evisceration
would sound the death knell to innovation.”).
10. See infra notes 368–84 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 104–12 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. Id.
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text, meanwhile, has been nearly absent. 14 Indeed, scholars
and Justice Thomas have explicitly called for a thorough
analysis of Section 230’s text because, while missing, it
would be highly probative. 15
These calls increase in
importance as the Supreme Court is poised to interpret the
statute for the first time in over a quarter century.
This Article offers the first comprehensive interpretation
of Section 230’s text and structure. The statute means what
it says, and has a clear four-part structure. First, the statute
excludes from protection entities that are properly
understood to be publishers rather than intermediaries. 16
Second, it treats, by default, all intermediaries as
distributors. 17 Third, it offers extra protection to certain
intermediaries—“Computer Good Samaritans”—who clean
up certain categories of objectionable content on the internet
in good faith. 18 Fourth, it offers the most protection to
“Computer Good Samaritans” who permit individuals to
moderate their own content; these intermediaries need not
even act in good faith. 19 This four-part structure fulfills the
statute’s tripartite goals of protecting free speech,
encouraging moderation of content unsuitable for children,
and enabling user choice. 20

14. See infra notes 104–12 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 104–12 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.B; 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(f)(2)-(3).
17. See infra Part II.C; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
18. See infra Part II.D; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
19. See infra Part II.E; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).
20. Though these conclusions are unrecognized by the prevailing doctrine,
many scholars have noted some of these conclusions. This Article differs in two
respects. First, it differs in its comprehensiveness. Statutory interpretation is a
holistic endeavor. By analyzing the statute in its entirety, this Article uncovers
new insights unrecognized by others. Second, this Article differs in its focus on
the text. It is one thing to note that a statute has exceeded its drafters’ intentions
or to catalogue its deleterious consequences; it is another to prove, with
specificity, that judges have diverged from the statutory text and to illustrate a
better way to read the text. In addition, the textual analysis provides a method
to evaluate the merit of the various intentionalist critiques. Further, given the
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This Article has dramatic ramifications for legal doctrine
and political reforms. As to doctrine, this Article finds that
judges have consistently misinterpreted the statute, and
thus argues for altering the standard for when Section 230
immunity attaches, the entities to which it applies, and the
nature of that immunity.
First, the current threshold test is precisely incorrect: it
requires an entity to act or be treated as a publisher for
Section 230 immunity to apply whereas, in fact, acting as a
publisher removes an entity from Section 230 protection
altogether. 21 The correct inquiry focuses on content
moderation: if the entity is an intermediary rather than a
publisher, the question is whether the types of content it
moderates aligns with the categories enumerated by
Congress. The cases interpreting Section 230 must therefore
be revisited.
Second, for internet entities to avail themselves of the
Section 230 protections they currently enjoy, they must
modify their community standards to align with the
categories of content enumerated by Congress; otherwise,
they might be potentially liable as distributors. Internet
entities will also have an incentive to encourage
decentralized or user-oriented methods of content
moderation, which are currently underway but have
remained underdeveloped, to avoid the “good faith”
rise of the new textualism, judges are more likely to be swayed by text-based
arguments than by intentionalist or policy arguments. See Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between
the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L. J. 1 (2018) (“[A]ll
federal courts have shifted toward more frequent use of textualist tools in recent
decades”); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 60 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013)
(“Over the last quarter-century, textualism has had an extraordinary influence
on how federal courts approach questions of statutory interpretation. When the
Court finds the text to be clear in context, it now routinely enforces the statute
as written.”).
21. This doctrinal test has led to absurd results: courts have held that entities
making ex ante editorial decisions—the essence of publishing—are protected by
Section 230. See infra Part II.C.
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requirement.
Third, the nature of the immunity will change: by
default, intermediaries will be immunized as publishers, but
not as distributors. This reawakens currently dormant
doctrinal questions, such as the scope and nature of
distributor liability for internet entities. 22
For current political debates, many proposed reforms
will be unnecessary under this Article because Section 230,
properly understood, already incorporates the substance of
many proposed reforms. 23 For instance, some have suggested
withholding Section 230 immunity from bad actors, or “Bad
Samaritans.” But Section 230, properly construed, already
does that: the core of Section 230 immunity inheres in
Section 230(c)(2), which contains a good faith requirement.
Others have proposed that Section 230 immunity should not
be extended to platforms restricting political opinions.
Section 230 already does not privilege the moderation of such
speech: Section 230(c)(2) immunity applies only to certain
narrowly circumscribed categories of material that are
inappropriate for children. If platforms moderate content
beyond these categories, the extra protection of Section
230(c)(2) does not apply. Thus, in these respects, Section 230
doesn’t need to be re-formed or re-written. It need only be reread.
For legal scholarship, this Article suggests that the effect
of inequality on interpretation is ripe for further research. 24
Recently, scholars have focused on debates within
textualism, rather than debates between textualism and
22. As discussed infra Part III.A, there are a number of ways to practically
change the doctrine: the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on a case related
to Section 230 (though the fact that the Court jointly granted certiorari to
Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh indicates the case might turn instead on the AntiTerrorism Act), litigants can sue in state court, litigants can sue under Section
230(c)(2) (which courts have ignored), Congress can pass a declaratory statute, or
the FCC can re-interpret the law using its rulemaking powers.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
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other interpretative methodologies, by questioning two
aspects that are seen as core to textualism: first, the focus on
context in interpretation; second, the attempt to discern the
statute’s original public meaning at the time of enactment.
The driving force behind this reconceptualization is to align
textualism to better respond to societal dynamics. Though
not a sustained theoretical exercise, this Article contributes
to this scholarly conversation by offering Section 230 as a
case study where a stubborn originalism can be more socially
responsive than a deliberate dynamism. Drawing on Marc
Galanter’s seminal theory, it speculates that this effect is due
to the distributional inequalities of wealth and power
inequality, because dynamism privileges more powerful
repeat defendants over one-shot plaintiffs. The interaction of
inequality and interpretation is ripe for further research.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces
Section 230 and outlines the dominance of purpose in the
courts and intention and consequences in the academy. Part
II forms the core of the text-based analysis of Section 230. It
illustrates the error of the prevailing judicial consensus, and
offers a sustained text-based analysis of the four operative
subsections. Part III cashes out this analysis by exploring
implications for doctrine, politics, and scholarship.
I.

SECTION 230: GENESIS, INTERPRETATION, CRITIQUE

This Section reviews the Section 230 status quo. Part I.A
introduces the legal history behind Section 230’s enactment:
Section 230 was intended to solve the judicially-created
“moderator’s dilemma,” which provided a perverse incentive
to refrain from moderating objectionable content on the
internet. Part I.B reviews how the federal courts have
interpreted Section 230—broadly and purposively—by
closely analyzing the seminal 1997 case Zeran v. AOL, the
interpretative framework of which has been adopted by all
twelve geographic federal circuit courts. Part I.C outlines
some major criticisms, scholarly and popular, of the Zerandominated doctrine, yet criticizes these critiques insofar as
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they employ intentionalist or consequentialist methods to
the exclusion of textualist methods.
A. Genesis: “Computer Good Samaritans”
In 1996, Congress passed a raft of amendments to the
Communications Act of 1934 with the intention of protecting
children on the internet. These laws were known as the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). 25 Among these
provisions was Section 230, which was initially known as the
Online Family Empowerment Act. 26 Section 230 was
proposed by then-Representatives Chris Cox and Ron Wyden
as an amendment to the House version of the CDA. 27
“Section 230 is a rule of intermediary liability. It gives
Internet intermediaries like network providers and online
service providers a privilege against certain lawsuits based
on content provided by third parties.” 28 If someone authors a
defamatory diatribe on Facebook, Facebook is not liable for
the post, security intermediaries (like CloudFare) or cloud
computing platforms (like Amazon Web Services) are not
liable for providing backend services, and broadband
providers (such as Fios or Comcast) are not liable for
permitting the traffic to flow through their networks. 29
Familiar online platforms such as Google, Facebook, Twitter,
and Craigslist are all protected by Section 230. 30 By
25. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
26. See 141 CONG. REC. 22,022 (1995).
27. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. (1995). For an excellent history of the passage of
Section 230, see KOSSEFF, supra note 2, at 57–76.
28. Balkin, Future, supra note 4, at 434. See, e.g., Ricci v. Teamsters Union
Loc. 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (“In short, a plaintiff defamed on the
internet can sue the original speaker, but typically ‘cannot sue the messenger.’”)
(quoting Chicago Laws.’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008)).
29. See Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 2037–40.
30. See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263,
1268 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (Facebook); Fields v. Twitter, Inc. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1121–29 (N.D. Cal.
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protecting platforms or websites from intermediary liability,
Section 230 protected the very third-party content on which
the internet thrives. 31 For this reason, Section 230 is known
as “The Twenty-Six Words That Created The Internet,” 32 or
“The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech.” 33
Section 230 was Congress’ response to a conundrum
known as the “moderator’s dilemma.” 34 This dilemma
perversely imposed additional liability for good-faith efforts
to moderate objectionable content on the internet. 35 The
roots of the moderator’s dilemma are found in the common
law and its differing treatment of publishers and
2016) (Twitter); Chicago Laws.’, 519 F.3d at 671 (Craigslist).
31. See KOSSEFF, supra note 2, at 4 (“Consider the ten most popular websites
in the United States as of 2018. Six—YouTube, Facebook, Reddit, Wikipedia,
Twitter, and eBay—primarily rely on videos, social media posts, and other
content provided by users. These companies simply could not exist without
Section 230. Two of the other top ten websites—Google and Yahoo—operate
massive search engines that rely on content from third parties. Even Amazon, a
retailer, has become the trusted consumer brand it is today because it allows
users to post unvarnished reviews of products. Only one of the top ten sites—
Netflix—mostly provides its own content. Section 230 has allowed third-party
content-based services to flourish in the United States.”).
32. KOSSEFF, supra note 2.
33. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 2 (article title).
34. The PACT Act and Section 230: The Impact of the Law that Helped Create
the Internet and an Examination of Proposed Reforms for Today’s Online World:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., Innovation, and the Internet
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Com., Sci., and Transp., 116th Cong. 3 (2020)
(statement of Chris Cox, former U.S. Rep.) (“Before the enactment of Section 230,
internet platforms faced a terrible dilemma. If they sought to enforce even
minimal rules of the road in order to maintain civility and keep their sites free
from obscenity and obnoxious behavior, they became unlimitedly liable for all of
the user-created content on their site. On the other hand, if the website followed
an ‘anything goes’ business model, with no content moderation whatsoever, then
it could completely avoid that liability. From the perspective of any internet
platform that attempted to maintain a family-friendly site, it was a classic case
of ‘no good deed goes unpunished.’”), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services
/files/BD6A508B-E95C-4659-8E6D-106CDE546D71; Michael A. Cheah, Section
230 and the Twitter Presidency, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 192, 197 (2020) (the
“moderator’s dilemma” [exists when] “service providers must choose between
aggressively removing content or curtailing moderation activities so that they do
not put themselves on notice of potential illegality”).
35. Id.
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distributors. 36 The common law distinguishes between
publishers (such as newspapers and book publishers), who
exercise a high level of editorial control, and distributors
(such as newsstands and bookstores), who disseminate
information without editorial control. 37
With great editorial power comes great legal
responsibility. Under the common law, publishers—who are
seen as active participants in the creation of knowledge—are
liable alongside authors for the defamatory or tortious
information they publish. 38 In contrast, distributors—who
are seen as passive conduits of information with limited
control over the information content—are liable only if they
have reason to know of the content’s unlawful character. 39
36. The PACT Act and Section 230: The Impact of the Law that Helped Create
the Internet and an Examination of Proposed Reforms for Today’s Online World:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., Innovation, and the Internet
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Com., Sci., and Transp., 116th Cong. 2 (2020)
(statement of Jeff Kosseff, Assistant Professor, Cyber Science Department, U.S.
Naval Academy) (“Lower courts generally adopted a rule, rooted in the common
law and the First Amendment, that distributors cannot be liable for content
created by others unless the distributors knew or had reason to know of the illegal
content. This rule applies not only to criminal obscenity cases, but also to civil
claims such as defamation.”), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files
/444EFF87-84E3-46DB-B8DB-24DC9A424869.
37. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).

38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (Except as
provided in § 578, “one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter
is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. L. INST. 1977)
(Distributors are liable “if, but only if” the distributor “knows or has reason to
know of its defamatory character.”). Further, increased liability on distributors
would give rise to fears of collateral censorship. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 152–53 (1959) (“There is no specific constitutional inhibition against
making the distributors of food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the
way of imposing a similar requirement on the bookseller . . . [f]or if the bookseller
is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, and the ordinance fulfills
its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected;
and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of
constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature . . . [a]nd the bookseller’s
burden would become the public’s burden, for by restricting” the bookseller “the
public’s access to reading matter would be restricted.”).
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So, for instance, under the common law, if the New York
Times were to publish a defamatory op-ed, both the author
and the Times would be liable for defamation, while a
newsstand that merely sold the paper would not be liable for
defamation.
The “moderator’s dilemma” arises (according to some
courts) when these common-law principles are imported to
the internet. While an interactive computer service has no
duty to reduce the flow of offensive material online, once the
service voluntarily undertakes such content moderation, it
may be liable for imperfect content moderation by assuming
the role of a publisher. 40 This means that if some content is
moderated, the interactive computer service is liable for the
content that was published on its platform that it did not
moderate. Thus, the common law alone (again, according to
some courts) creates a disturbing dilemma that forces the
interactive computer service to choose between two different
approaches: either (1) moderate content, be treated as a
publisher, and accept liability for problematic content that
the moderator might miss, or (2) decline to moderate and
permit any third-party content, no matter how problematic,
offensive, or unlawful the content might be. 41
This “moderator’s dilemma” was instantiated by a New
York trial court in the case Stratton Oakmont in 1995. 42 The
plaintiffs were Stratton Oakmont, an investment banking
firm (and, incidentally, later the subject of The Wolf of Wall

40. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (holding that because it
exercised editorial control, “PRODIGY is a publisher rather than a distributor”);
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[S]uch regulation
cast[s] the service provider in the role of the publisher.”). The moderator’s
dilemma was not inevitable. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp.
135, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (moderation insufficient to turn interactive computer
service from distributer into publisher); see also Kosseff, supra note 36, at 2 (“This
common law rule was first applied to an online service in 1991, in a defamation
action against CompuServe, one of the earliest national online dial-up services.”).
41. See Cheah, supra note 344.
42. 1995 WL 323710.
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Street), and its president Daniel Porush. 43 They sued
PRODIGY, “an online service that exercised editorial control
over the content of messages posted on its computer bulletin
boards,” for defamation. 44 At issue were posts by an “an
unidentified bulletin board user or ‘poster’ on PRODIGY’s
‘Money Talk’ computer bulletin board” in October 1994. 45
These posts claimed that the plaintiffs “committed criminal
and fraudulent acts.” 46 The plaintiffs claimed that PRODIGY
was liable for defamatory content posted by others because
“PRODIGY exercised sufficient editorial control over its
computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the
same responsibilities as a newspaper.” 47
The court ruled for Stratton Oakmont. It agreed that
“PRODIGY exercised sufficient editorial control over its
computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the
same responsibilities as a newspaper.” 48 It held that when a
provider moderated the content on its website—for instance,
“[b]y actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of
offensiveness and ‘bad taste’ [] PRODIGY [was] clearly
making decisions as to content” and “such decisions
constitute editorial control.” 49 Because “PRODIGY has
uniquely arrogated to itself the role of determining what is
proper for its members to post and read on its bulletin
boards,” the court was “compelled to conclude that for the
purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action, PRODIGY is a
publisher rather than a distributor.” 50 As such, PRODIGY
was therefore liable for content that remained on the
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id.
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platform: “PRODIGY’s conscious choice, to gain the benefits
of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability
than CompuServe and other computer networks that make
no such choice.” 51
Section 230 was specifically intended to “override”
Stratton Oakmont and similar decisions that provided a
disincentive for good-faith and good-will moderation
efforts. 52
Congress solved the moderator’s dilemma by borrowing
a concept from state-level Good Samaritan statutes. Good
Samaritan statutes solved similar dilemmas, where doing a
voluntary good deed gave rise to legal liability. At common
law, a physician who volunteers to aid the victim of a
roadside accident might thereby assume a duty of care and
become subject to liability for injuries resulting from her
failure to help effectively. In response, every state legislature
has passed a Good Samaritan statute, which shields those
who make “good faith” efforts at emergency care from tort
liability. 53
In other words, Congress passed its own Good Samaritan

51. Id. at 5.
52. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 189 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific
purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other
similar decision which have treated providers and users as publishers or speakers
of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material. The conferees believe that such decisions create serious
obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the
content of communications their children receive through interactive computer
services.”); 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); Cox, supra note
34, at 3 (“The impetus for the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act,
today’s Section 230, was a New York Superior Court case [Stratton Oakmont]
that I first saw reported in the Wall Street Journal in May 1995.”); FTC v.
LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The [CDA] was
intended to overrule Stratton [Oakmont] and provide immunity for ‘interactive
computer service[s]’ that make ‘good faith’ efforts to block and screen offensive
content”).
53. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and application of “good
samaritan” statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th § 2, at 300.
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statute: Section 230. 54 It decided that an interactive
computer service that decides to moderate content does not
assume a duty of care and should not become subject to
liability for content that it failed to moderate effectively. 55 In
doing so, Congress tried to shield from unnecessary
punishment intermediaries that perform good deeds and
remove objectionable content from the internet.
B. Interpretation: Purposivism’s Dominance
Currently, all federal appellate courts apply Section 230
broadly and purposively. 56 This breadth applies in three
ways. First, Section 230 protects against a broad array of
lawsuits because it “creates a federal immunity to any cause
of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the
service.” 57 Second, immunity is not limited by the type of
content: “[c]ourts have construed the immunity provisions in
§ 230 broadly in all cases arising from the publication of
54. Section 230(c) is expressly captioned “Protection for Good Samaritan
blocking and screening of offensive materials.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). See also 141
CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“[O]ur amendment will . . .
protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who
provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes steps to screen
indecency and offensive material for their customers. It will protect them from
taking on liability such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New York that they
should not face for helping us and for helping us solve this problem.”); Cox, supra
note 34, at 3 (“By imposing liability on criminals and tortfeasors for their own
wrongful communications and conduct, rather than shifting that liability to a
website that did not in any way participate in the wrongdoing, it freed each
website to clean up its corner of the internet. No longer would being a ‘Good
Samaritan’ buy trouble.”).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
56. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir.
2007) (“The other courts that have addressed these issues have generally
interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly.”).
57. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasis
added); see also Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding
whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce
immune under section 230.”).
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user-generated content.” 58 Third, Section 230 immunity is
not limited by the squalid actions of the intermediary: “that
a website operates through a meretricious business model is
not enough to strip away those [Section 230] protections.” 59
In short, “[p]arties complaining that they were harmed by a
Web site’s publication of user-generated content” may not
sue “the interactive computer service that enabled them to
publish the content online.” 60
The root of this broad, purposive interpretation of
Section 230 lies in the 1997 Fourth Circuit case Zeran v.
America Online, Inc. 61 In that case, Kenneth Zeran sued
AOL for failing to remove, upon notice, a false advertisement
for “the sale of shirts featuring offensive and tasteless
slogans” related to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which
listed Zeran’s home phone number in Seattle, Washington. 62
“As a result of this anonymously perpetrated prank, Zeran
received a high volume of calls, comprised primarily of angry
and derogatory messages, but also death threats.” 63 After
AOL removed that post, the unknown prankster “continued
to post messages on AOL’s bulletin board, advertising
additional items including bumper stickers and key chains
with still more offensive slogans.” 64 As a result of this prank,
“Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately
every two minutes.” 65 The threats intensified after “an
announcer for Oklahoma City radio station KRXO . . .
related the [prank] message’s contents on the air, attributed

58. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
59. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016), superseded by
statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017
(FOSTA), Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253.
60. Myspace, 528 F.3d at 419.
61. 129 F.3d 327.
62. Id. at 329.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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them to ‘Ken’ at Zeran’s phone number, and urged the
listening audience to call the number.” 66
Zeran sued AOL “for defamatory speech initiated by a
third party,” and “argued to the district court that once he
notified AOL of the unidentified third party’s hoax, AOL had
a duty to remove the defamatory posting promptly, to notify
its subscribers of the message’s false nature, and to
effectively screen future defamatory material.” 67 AOL pled
Section 230 as an affirmative defense.
The Fourth Circuit held that Section 230(c)(1) precludes
Zeran’s suit because the statute “creates a federal immunity
to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of
the service.” 68 Specifically, “§ 230 precludes courts from
entertaining claims that would place a computer service
provider in a publisher’s role.” 69 Thus, lawsuits like Zeran’s,
“seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are
barred.” 70
Other than a cursory cite to the statutory text (but,
significantly, not to either subsection (c)(2) or the statutory
definitions), the Zeran court’s conclusion—that Section 230
“forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service
provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory
functions” 71—was largely based on the “purpose of this
statutory immunity.” 72 “Congress recognized the threat that
tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and

66. Id.
67. Id. at 330.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 331.
72. Id. at 330.
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burgeoning Internet medium.” 73 Given that “[i]nteractive
computer services” had, in 1997, “millions of users”—leading
to “staggering” amounts of information shared over the
internet—the “specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect.” 74 “It
would be impossible for service providers to screen each of
their millions of postings for possible problems.” 75 “Faced
with potential liability for each message republished by their
services, interactive computer service providers might
choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages
posted.” 76 To counter this, “Section 230 was enacted . . . to
maintain the robust nature of Internet communication.” 77
Accordingly, the statute limited recourse of those aggrieved
by online content only to the originator of that content, not
to the intermediary. Congress made a policy choice to not
“deter harmful online speech through the separate route of
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious
messages.” 78
In short, Zeran made a number of key interpretative
moves. It viewed Section 230 as reducible to subsection (c)(1),
ignoring subsection (c)(2). Because it focused only on
subsection (c)(1), it applied a sweeping immunity to internet
intermediaries, and did not limit this immunity by the
content in fact moderated. Rather, it viewed the criterion of
immunity as whether the intermediary undertook the
activity of “publication.” 79 It then defined “publication” quite
broadly, including within it the decision to “publish” or

73. Id.
74. Id. at 331.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 330.
78. Id. at 330–31.
79. Id. at 330 (“Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims
that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.”).
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“alter” content. 80 Undergirding this broad interpretation was
a purposive argument that Section 230’s goal was to promote
“unfettered speech on the Internet.” 81
Zeran’s interpretation of Section 230—that subsection
(c)(1) is the operative section of the statute and the criterion
for immunity is mere “publication”—is the consensus view
throughout the federal courts. 82 Every circuit has cited
Zeran’s ruling as authoritative, and a number have expressly
called it a “seminal” opinion. 83 In addition, judges routinely
refer to Section 230’s “purpose” to apply it broadly. 84
C. Critique: Intentionalism and Consequentialism
The critiques of Section 230 doctrine have applied
intentionalist or consequentialist methods, but have
80. Id. (Lawsuits “seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”).
81. Id. at 334.
82. See Gregory Dickinson, Towards Textual Internet Immunity, 33 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 10–11 (Mar. 2022) (“Thus far, the story has been one of
judicial lemmings citing other courts’ decisions as if maximal immunity
inevitably flows from the words of the statute. It does not.”).
83. See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir.
2007); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 63 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing Zeran
as “seminal”); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); Doe
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Dirty World Ent.
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014); Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d
733, 743 (7th Cir. 2016); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2010);
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co.
v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); Almeida v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006); Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163,
1166 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing Zeran as “seminal”). Professor Eric Goldman
has called Zeran “the most important Section 230 case of all time.” Eric Goldman,
Want to Learn More About Section 230? A Guide to My Work, TECH. & MKTG. L.
BLOG (July 1, 2020), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/07/want-tolearn-more-about-section-230-a-guide-to-my-work.htm.
84. See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 71; see also Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma
Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 14 (2020) (Thomas, J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari) (The Ninth Circuit’s “decision to stress purpose
and policy is familiar. Courts have long emphasized nontextual arguments when
interpreting § 230.”).
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neglected the statute’s text.
Many critiques employ intentionalist methods, arguing
that Section 230 doctrine has strayed from its origins. For
instance, Professor Danielle Keats Citron, a prominent
internet law scholar, and Ben Wittes, a well-respected
journalist, have written that it “would seem absurd to the
CDA’s drafters” to grant “immunity to platforms designed in
part or in whole for illegal activity.” 85 Section 230 “was, after
all, part of the Communications Decency Act.” 86 Section 230
“was by no means meant to immunize services whose
business is the active subversion of online decency—
businesses that are not merely failing to take ‘Good
Samaritan’ steps to protect users from online indecency but
are actually being ‘Bad Samaritans.’” 87 They argue that
judicial interpretations of Section 230 have strayed far from
the statute’s origins, and the consensus “overbroad
interpretation” of Section 230 “has left victims of online
abuse with no leverage against site operators whose business
models facilitate abuse.” 88 Other scholars have made similar
intentionalist arguments. 89 Citron and Mary Anne Franks,
another internet law scholar, wrote that courts’ “indulgent
approach to Section 230 veers far away . . . from the original
intentions of Section 230’s sponsors.” 90 “Rather than treating
85. Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:
Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 409 (2017).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 404.
89. See Mary Graw Leary, The Indecency and Injustice of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 565 (2018) (Section
230 “was never intended to provide a form of absolute immunity for any and all
actions taken by interactive computer services.”); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 4:86 (2d ed. 2019) (“[C]ourts have extended the immunity in § 230
far beyond anything that plausibly could have been intended by Congress);
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 335, 342–343 (2005) (“Courts, however, have expanded § 230 far beyond
Congress’s original intent by immunizing ISPs and websites from distributor
liability and virtually every other tort action.”).
90. Citron & Franks, Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The
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Section 230 as a legal shield for responsible moderation
efforts, courts have stretched it far beyond what its words,
context, and purpose support. Section 230 has been read to
immunize from liability platforms that: knew about users’
illegal activity, deliberately refused to remove it, and
ensured that those users could not be identified; solicited
users to engage in tortious and illegal activity; and designed
their sites to enhance the visibility of illegal activity while
ensuring that the perpetrators could not be identified and
caught.” 91
Arguments employing consequentialist methods abound
as well, both for and against Section 230. In the political
sphere, Section 230’s detractors point to the statute’s
harmful consequences, arguing that the statute purportedly
protects the publication and dissemination of damaging
content and conduct. 92 For instance, one proposed
Congressional reform to Section 230—the Justice Against
Malicious Algorithms Act—punishes social media platforms
that “actively amplify content that endangers our families,
promote conspiracy theories, and incite extremism.” 93
Similarly, another proposed reform to Section 230—the
SAFE TECH Act—is based on the notion that “Section 230
has provided a ‘Get Out of Jail Free’ card to the largest
platform companies even as their sites are used by scam
artists, harassers and violent extremists to cause damage
and injury.” 94
Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform,
2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 61 (2020).
91. Id. at 50–51.
92. Such activity is protected by the First Amendment. See United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005
and thereby holding that lies qualify as protected speech).
93. Press Release, House Comm. On Energy & Comm., E&C Leaders
Announce Legislation to Reform Section 230, (Oct. 14, 2021)
https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/ec-leadersannounce-legislation-to-reform-section-230.
94. Press Release, Warner, Hirono, Klobuchar Announce the SAFE TECH Act
to Reform Section 230, Off. of Sen. Mark Warner (Feb. 5, 2021),
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Similarly, in the academy, a number of scholars have
pointed out Section 230’s harmful consequences. A number
write that Section 230 enables harmful content to proliferate
and jeopardizes the right to free speech. For instance, Citron
and Wittes are “skeptical that § 230, as currently
interpreted, is really optimizing free speech. It gives an
irrational degree of free speech benefit to harassers and
scofflaws but ignores important free speech costs to victims.
Individuals have difficulty expressing themselves in the face
of online assaults.” 95 Additionally, Citron and Franks write
that “[t]he overbroad interpretation of Section 230 means
that platforms have scant legal incentive to combat online
abuse. Rebecca Tushnet put it well a decade ago: Section 230
ensures
that
platforms
enjoy
‘power
without
96
responsibility.’” “At the same time,” they write, “Section
230 has subsidized platforms whose business is online abuse
and the platforms who benefit from ignoring abuse. It takes
away the leverage that victims might have had to get
harmful content taken down.” 97 Meanwhile, Section 230,
they claim, has “undermined equal opportunity in
employment, politics, journalism, education, cultural
influence, and free speech.” 98 Professor Olivier Sylvain has
written that “[t]he problem with prevailing Section 230
doctrine today is not only that it protects online services that
amplify and deliver misleading or dangerous information by
design.” 99 Rather, “the principal problems . . . are the ways
in which powerful online application and service designs
harm people for whom hard-fought public-law consumer
protections (such as civil-rights laws or rules against unfair
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=55514D D47824-40A9- A482-64121A033266.
95. Citron & Wittes, supra note 855, at 420.
96. Citron & Franks, supra note 90, at 52.
97. Id. at 54.
98. Id. at 56.
99. Olivier Sylvain, Platform Realism, Informational Inequality, and Section
230 Reform, YALE L. J. F. 475, 500 (2021).
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or deceptive trade practices) are essential.” 100
In contrast, Section 230’s champions argue that Section
230’s consequences are, on balance, more positive than
harmful. They write that Section 230 provides “a form of
protection against frivolous lawsuits” that will suffocate
upstart challengers to the dominant technology incumbents
should Section 230 be revoked. 101 Therefore, “reductions to
Section 230’s scope pose serious risks to Internet speech”
because “Section 230 derives a lot of its strengths from its
‘horizontal’ application to disparate causes of action.” 102 “If
Congress excludes more causes of action from Section 230’s
coverage, it increases defense costs, creates more
constitutional litigation (as defendant [sic] now turn to the
First Amendment as a backup defense), and encourages
plaintiffs to shoehorn their claims into the new exclusion.” 103
While intentionalism and consequentialism are
widespread, the statute’s text is remarkably absent.
Recently, scholars and judges have noted this absence.

100. Id.
101. Mike Masnick, Those Who Don’t Understand Section 230 Are Doomed To
Repeal It, TECHDIRT, https://www.techdirt.com/2021/12/29/those-who-dontunderstand-section-230-are-doomed-to-repeal-it/ (“Again, the key benefit to
Section 230 is not that it removes all liability, but rather that it gets cases
dismissed very early on, cases that would have almost no chance if they went
through the full litigation process. In other words, it’s a form of protection against
frivolous lawsuits, and the main mechanism involved is getting cases dismissed
earlier, rather than years [and millions of dollars later]. That helps smaller
companies way more than it helps Facebook. Facebook has all the money in the
world and it can afford to litigate these cases all the way through. It would cost
the company pocket change, but the company would likely still win in the end.”);
see also Cox, supra note 34, at 3 (“In an imagined future world without Section
230, where websites and internet platforms again face enormous potential
liability for hosting content created by others, there would again be a powerful
incentive to limit that exposure. Online platforms could accomplish this in one of
two ways. They could strictly limit user-generated content, or even eliminate it
altogether; or they could adopt the ‘anything goes’ model that was the way to
escape liability before Section 230 existed.”).
102. Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33, 45 (2019).
103. Id. at 45.
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In the academy, Professor Gregory Dickinson has noted
the absence of the statute’s text and lamented that the
judicial “glosses” of Section 230 doctrine have “swallow[ed]
the text to form a doctrine untethered from the statute that
gave it life.” 104 “By taking a statute targeted to promote
internet publication and the censorship of indecent material
and pressing it into service as an internet-freedom cure-all,
courts have created an expansive doctrine of immunity that
is ill-suited for the modern internet, yet now cemented in
precedent across the country.” 105 Professor Dickinson has
called for a renewed focus on the statute’s text, and called for
judges to “put their judicial laboratories of democracy to
work to tailor a textual solution suited for the modern
internet.” 106 Other academics have noted that the Section
230 doctrine has expanded beyond what the text supports—
which is the correct conclusion—but have offered no concrete
analysis of the text. 107
In the judiciary, Justice Thomas noted that the gap
between the statutory text and its judicial gloss has become
a chasm. 108 Justice Thomas questioned the consensus
interpretation, writing that lower courts’ Section 230
decisions that confer “sweeping immunity on some of the
largest companies in the world” constitute “questionable
precedent,” given that these courts have “emphasized
nontextual arguments” and have strayed from the statute’s
original meaning. 109 “Adopting the too-common practice of
reading extra immunity into statutes where it does not
belong,” Justice Thomas wrote, “courts have relied on policy
104. Dickinson, Towards Textual Internet Immunity, supra note 82, at 5.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 10.
107. See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just
Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 454–55
(2018).
108. See generally Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141
S. Ct. 13 (2020).
109. Id. at 13–14.
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and purpose arguments to grant sweeping protection to
Internet platforms.” 110 Justice Thomas concluded that “in an
appropriate case, it behooves” the Court to decide “the correct
interpretation of § 230.” 111
These calls for greater textual analysis are useful, and
there is more work to be done. Professor Dickinson’s
approach lacks specifics, and provides only two broad
predictions about where a text-focused approach would
lead—that “tech companies” would be somehow considered
“‘responsible for’ the content they host” and “would limit
online entities’ ability to assert immunity in lawsuits not
directly related to publication.” 112 To be fair, the lack of
specifics is to be expected for a call for greater inquiry.
Justice Thomas, in contrast, provides a number of detailed
critiques. He highlighted four areas where lower courts have
departed from a “modest understanding” of the statute,
critiquing the courts that have (1) “discarded the
longstanding distinction between ‘publisher’ liability and
‘distributor’ liability,” 113 (2) “departed from the most natural
reading of the text by giving Internet companies immunity
for their own content,” 114 (3) “eviscerated the narrower
liability shield [of Section 230(c)(2)] Congress included in the
statute” and “have curtailed the limits Congress placed on
decisions to remove content,” 115 and (4) erroneously
“extended § 230 to protect companies from a broad array of
traditional product-defect claims.” 116
Though Justice Thomas offers compelling arguments in
each issue, his treatment is also limited. First, the statement
analyzes each issue in isolation, without considering the
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id. at 18.
112. Dickinson, supra note 82, at 9.
113. Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 15.
114. Id. at 16.
115. Id. at 16, 17.
116. Id.
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interrelation between Section 230’s subsections. Second, it is
incomplete, as it misses a number of issues. Third, it skirts a
deeper question: are these arguments signs that the
“consensus” is fundamentally correct but needs a few coursecorrections, or is the “consensus” fundamentally wrong?
Given the pervasive discussion surrounding Section 230, it
seems that there is something fundamentally wrong about
how Section 230 has been interpreted. But Justice Thomas
does not explain this fundamental error. Fourth, the
implications for technology companies are unclear from his
statement alone. 117 To be fair, Justice Thomas’s statement is
not intended to be comprehensive, and it usefully illuminates
a path forward.
This Article argues that there exists a fundamental error
in Zeran: that it focused on Section 230(c)(1) to the exclusion
of Section 230(c)(2). With this paradigm shift in mind, a
textual interpretation of Section 230 does not mean a repeal
of the statute and the ensuing uncertainty. Rather, a textual
interpretation will lead to a far richer and more complex
application of the statute than the current doctrine offers.
The text, in other words, is not only an avenue for critiquing
Section 230. It is also an avenue for a constructive
interpretation of the statute. The next Part will show how.
II. READING SECTION 230
This Part conducts an in-depth analysis of the text and
structure of Section 230 to elucidate the statute’s meaning
and to illustrate a statutory scheme. Part II.A illustrates the
fundamental category error of the Zeran “consensus”: that it
sees Section 230(c)(1) as the operative section granting
intermediary immunity whereas, in truth, Section 230(c)(2)
is the operative section that provides immunity beyond the
common law. Part II.B introduces an often-overlooked
117. The lack of clear implications for technology companies is perhaps the
reason why Justice Thomas was not joined by any other of the Court’s seven
textualists, despite the strength of his textualist arguments.
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threshold inquiry for Section 230: that, contra Zeran, its
protections do not extend to entities that perform traditional
publisher activities; rather, Section 230 protects only
intermediaries. Part II.C analyzes Section 230(c)(1), which
states a baseline rule that an “interactive computer
service”—which is an entity that either serves or moderates
information—is a distributor of that information, and shall
not be treated as a publisher. That much reaffirms the
common law. Part II.D analyzes Section 230(c)(2)(A), which
states that “Computer Good Samaritans” who actively clean
up the internet get additional protection—they are not liable
as publishers or distributors. Part II.E analyzes Section
230(c)(2)(B), which states that if an intermediary permits
others to restrict access to the content themselves, either
through user tools or decentralized protocols, the “good faith”
requirement does not apply. This four-part structure fulfills
the statute’s tripartite goals of protecting free speech,
encouraging moderation of certain specific types of content
unsuitable for children, and enabling user choice.
A. Zeran’s Error: Revisiting Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2)
The first step in a textual interpretation is to determine
which part of the statute to analyze. 118 Judges analyzing
Section 230, however, have largely interpreted the wrong
subsection. After Zeran, it is universally assumed that
Section 230(c)(1) is the section that creates some sort of
liability shield for internet intermediaries: the only debate is
how far it extends. Zeran, ignoring Section 230(c)(2), cited
only Section 230(c)(1) as the basis for sweeping intermediary
immunity. 119 The federal courts have unquestioningly
118. See Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 572–73
(2017); see VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 42
(Harvard Univ. Press, 2016).
119. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its plain
language, [Section 230(c)(1)] creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a thirdparty user of the service. Specifically, [Section 230(c)(1)] precludes courts from
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followed suit. 120 In the words of a popular book, it is the
“Twenty-Six Words” of Section 230(c)(1) “[t]hat [c]reated
[t]he [i]nternet” by providing intermediaries immunity from
suit. 121 And even those who criticize the sweeping
interpretation of Section 230 assume that it is Section
230(c)(1) that provides immunity from suit. 122
As this section shows, this assumption is incorrect.
Section 230(c)(1) does not create a liability shield—that task
falls to Section 230(c)(2)—but rather reaffirms the liability
protections that already existed at common law. It says that
an “interactive computer service”—defined either as a
passive conduit or an intermediary that moderates content—
shall not “be treated as the publisher” of the information it
makes available. Section 230(c)(1) reaffirms the previouslyrecognized rule that websites that make no moderation
efforts are treated as distributors, not publishers. Section
230(c)(1) does nothing to overturn Stratton Oakmont or solve
the moderator’s dilemma.
Rather, it is Section 230(c)(2) that overrules Stratton
Oakmont and creates intermediary immunity by stating
that, under certain circumstances, content moderation
efforts do not turn websites from distributors into publishers.
In contrast to Section 230(c)(1), which provides no new legal
liabilities or rights, Section 230(c)(2) creates new legal
immunities: it is captioned “civil liability” and states that an
entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s
role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”).
120. Even sophisticated courts have erred. See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky
Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Section 230(c)(1) is directly aimed
at the problem created by the Stratton decision.”); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570
F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Subsection (c)(1), by itself, shields from liability
all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect to
content generated entirely by third parties”).
121. KOSSEFF, supra note 2.
122. Indeed, the text of many current Congressional Section 230 reforms
explicitly amend subsection (c)(1). See e.g., Justice Against Malicious Algorithms
Act, H.R. 5596, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
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intermediary shall not “be held liable” for all content that the
moderator either fails to moderate or chooses not to
moderate. Though Section 230(c)(2) has been ignored, it is
the true legal workhorse of the statute.
Section 230(c)(1) reads:
Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider. 123

Meanwhile, Section 230(c)(2) states that:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected. 124

Section 230(c)(1) applies as a default rule in the ordinary
course: when a “provider or user of an interactive computer
service” serves “information provided by another information
content provider,” it “shall” not “be treated as the publisher
or speaker” of that information. That is a reasonable rule,
and aligns with the common law rule stated that an
intermediary conduit is not considered a publisher. 125 In this
way, subsection (c)(1) reaffirms the (perceived) holding of
Cubby, which held that internet intermediaries are

123. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
124. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (AM. L. INST. 1977); Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (“[D]istributors such as book stores and libraries may be
liable for defamatory statements of others only if they knew or had reason to
know of the defamatory statement at issue.”); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“New York courts have long held that
vendors and distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither
know nor have reason to know of the defamation.”).
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distributors. 126
However, special protection is given to entities that take
action to control the flow of objectionable material on the
internet: “any action voluntarily taken . . . to restrict access
to or availability of . . . obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable”
material shall not give rise to any liability—either for the
material that is actually moderated or for the material that
is not moderated. After all, the statute wants to protect
Computer Good Samaritans; the last thing Congress wants
to do is to hold them liable for a good deed.

126. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140–41. Though Cubby is often invoked as a
foil to Stratton Oakmont—that the former dealt with when an entity did not exert
control over the contents of the forum, whereas the latter did—that is not true.
CompuServe had robust community guidelines—as did every internet service
provider at the time. As stated in the second paragraph of the Cubby opinion,
CompuServe contracted with a company to “‘manage, review, create, delete, edit
and otherwise control the contents’ of the Journalism Forum ‘in accordance with
editorial and technical standards and conventions of style as established by
CompuServe.” Id. at 137 (“CompuServe has no opportunity to review
Rumorville’s contents before DFA uploads it into CompuServe’s computer banks,
from which it is immediately available to approved CIS subscribers.”).
Stratton Oakmont attempted to distinguish Cubby in two ways; neither is
availing. “First, PRODIGY held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards.” Stratton Oakmont, 1995
WL 323710, at *4. But for the purposes of liability, a company’s marketing
materials do not matter; its actions do. It is the substance of the actions taken,
not the superficial characterizations, that are of legal import. “Second, PRODIGY
implemented this control through its automatic software screening program, and
the Guidelines which Board Leaders are required to enforce.” Id. But whether
the moderation happens automatically or manually is of no import. In addition,
CompuServe also had community guidelines.
The common-law rule, as encapsulated by Cubby, comports with the law of
distributors: just as newspaper stands remove content that is not “good for
business” but do not thereby lose their status as distributors, so too internet
entities remove content that is not “good for business” but would thereby not lose
their status as distributors. They would only not be subject to the additional
protections of Section 230, which protect even against distributor liability to
reward the moderation of obscene or offensive content. The relevant distinction
is not between a passive, “anything-goes” conduit and an active, moderating
conduit, but rather between ex ante and ex post editorial judgments. So long as
websites do not make ex ante editorial judgments, they are not considered
publishers.
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Confirming this straightforward reading of the plain
statutory text are a number of indications, using the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, that this is the
correct reading.
First, absent from Section 230(c)(1) is any discussion of
“immunity,” or any other phrase that would indicate the
granting of legal rights. 127 This stands in contrast to Section
230(c)(2), which offers a grant of immunity in writing that
“no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable.” 128 The canon of meaningful variation—“that
a negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of
language from one statutory provision that is included in
other provisions of the same statute”—states that this
difference is meaningful. 129 But this is not even the ordinary
invocation of the canon of meaningful variation, which often
“assumes a perfection of drafting that, as an empirical
matter, is not often achieved.” 130 This variation occurs within
the same subsection. To assume that Congress did not mean
anything by this difference would be to assume that
Congress was asleep at the wheel to the extent that it would
make any statutory interpretation impossible. 131 Indeed, the
meaningful difference canon extends to other sections of
127. See Chi. Laws.’ Comm. For Civ. Rts. Under L. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Subsection (c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any
synonym.”); City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“[S]ubsection (c)(1) does not create an ‘immunity’ of any kind. It limits who may
be called the publisher of in-formation that appears online.”).
128. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
129. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006); see generally ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 25
(2012) (“Presumption of Consistent Usage”).
130. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129 at 170.
131. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (“[N]egative implications
raised by disparate provisions are strongest when the portions of a statute
treated differently had already been joined together and were being considered
simultaneously when the language raising the implication was inserted.”); Field
v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (“The more apparently deliberate the contrast,
the stronger the inference, as applied, for example, to contrasting statutory
sections originally enacted simultaneously in relevant respects . . . .”).

2022]

READING SECTION 230

1269

Section 230, and the CDA in which it was initially a part,
both of which contain sections that provide immunity from
liability. 132 Given that the difference is meaningful,
interpreters should “refrain from reading a phrase into the
statute when Congress has left it out.” 133
Second, the headings indicate that Section 230(c)(2) is
the operative subsection. In general, as the Supreme Court
has observed, “the title of a statute or section can aid in
resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text.” 134 And
courts have stressed the importance of captions and headings
in interpreting Section 230, writing that “the substance of
section 230(c) can and should be interpreted consistent with
its caption.” 135 First, consider the individual captions of each
subsection. It is Section 230(c)(2), not Section 230(c)(1), that
is captioned “Civil Liability,” which indicates that immunity
inheres in subsection (c)(2), not (c)(1). 136 In addition, Section
230 is titled “Protection for private blocking and screening of
offensive material,” which clearly references subsection
(c)(2)—the section that contains the words “offensive” and
“material,” and which, then, presumably provides the
“[p]rotection for private blocking and screening” of this
132. See 47 U.S.C. § 230I(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.”); 47 U.S.C. § 223(f)(1) (“No cause of action may be brought in any
court or administrative agency against any person . . .” ).
133. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993).
134. INS v. National Ctr. For Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189
(1991); see generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129, § 35, at 221–24 (“Titleand-Headings Canon”).
135. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008); see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (“§ 230(c)—
which is, recall, part of the ‘Communications Decency Act’—bears the title
‘Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material’,
hardly an apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing
about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their services. . . .
Why not . . . harmonize the text [of Section 230] with the caption?”). And while “a
statute’s caption must yield to its text when the two conflict,” id., here, there is
no conflict: both the text and the caption indicate that it is Section 230(c)(2), not
Section 230(c)(1), that deals with immunity from liability.
136. Section 230(c)(1) is captioned “Treatment of publisher or speaker.”
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“offensive material,” which is the entire point of the
statute. 137
Third, the Zeran reading obliterates Section 230(c)(2)
from the statute. The canon against surplusage states that
“a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous.” 138 Even those who doubt the canon against
surplusage would not favor an interpretation of one
subsection that eliminated an entire other subsection. 139 But
that is precisely what the Zeran reading does. Zeran leaves
no room for Section 230(c)(2): if Section 230(c)(1) is truly a
“prophylaxis” 140 under which internet companies are not
held liable for third-party or user-generated information,
Section 230(c)(2) is superfluous. 141 If all internet entities are
137. See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 80 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Indeed, the conference
committee summarized § 230 by stating that it ‘provides ‘Good Samaritan’
protections from civil liability for providers or users of an interactive computer
service for actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable
online material’—a description that could just as easily have applied to
§ 230(c)(2) alone.”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194). Indeed, this description
did “appl[y] to § 230(c)(2) alone.” Id.
138. Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 131 (2014). See generally SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 129, § 26 (“Surplusage Canon”).
139. Especially given, as in this case, that the purportedly superfluous section
is longer and more detailed, which indicates that Congress did not at all intend
for it to be superfluous. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12929, at 175–76
(“Lawyers rarely argue that an entire provision should be ignored,” but in one of
the rare instances when it did happen, “[t]he court correctly rejected this
argument”) (citing Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
140. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016).
141. See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13,
16 (2020) (“The decisions that broadly interpret § 230(c)(1) to protect traditional
publisher functions also eviscerated the narrower liability shield Congress
included in the statute.”); e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 14-cv646, 2017 WL 2210029, *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“But interpreting the CDA
this way results in the general immunity in (c)(1) swallowing the more specific
immunity in (c)(2).”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Jane Doe v. Facebook,
Inc., 2021 WL 4441272, (“The sweeping interpretation of Section 230(c)(1)
advanced by the Texas Supreme Court effectively reads Section 230(c)(2) out of
the statute.”).
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not considered the publisher of user-generated materials,
then there is no reason why they should be liable for
removing information. Indeed, the dominance of Zeran is
likely why there has been vanishingly little litigation
surrounding Section 230(c)(2): all the cases are disposed of
on Section 230(c)(1) grounds. 142 But Zeran’s approach
removes Section 230(c)(2) from the statute, which is an
incorrect way to interpret a statute. 143
Fourth, the words “information” and “material” are
strong intratextual clues as to the meanings of subsections
(c)(1) and (c)(2). 144 In Section 230, “information” seems to
refer to the pro-social, beneficial knowledge that we do
receive (and should want to receive): Congress applauds that
the internet “represent[s] an extraordinary advance in the
availability of educational and informational resources to
our citizens,” 145 appreciates that the internet “offer[s] users
a great degree of control over the information that they
receive,” 146 and aims “to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals, families, and
schools.” 147 In contrast, “material” seems to refer to matters
142. Indeed, most decisions about taking down content—which is, according to
most courts, the sole province of subsection (c)(2)—are decided on (c)(1) grounds.
See, e.g., Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Vimeo
is entitled to immunity under either (c)(1) or (c)(2)” for its takedown decision);
Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., 444 F. App’x 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (analyzing
MySpace’s decision to “delete . . . user profiles” under subsection(c)(1)); Ebeid v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 18-cv-07030, 2019 WL 2059662, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019)
(“[D]efendant’s decision to remove plaintiff’s posts undoubtedly falls under
‘publisher’ conduct” under 230(c)(1)).
143. Nor is it the best reading of the statute: if either section is to eliminate
the other, the lengthier and more detailed section—Section 230(c)(2)—should be
given priority.
144. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 796 (1999)
(Intratextualism is a tool that finds significance when “various words and
phrases appear and recur in the document[.]”).
145. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (emphasis added).
146. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2) (emphasis added).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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that are offensive and objectionable. By passing Section
230—titled “Protection for private blocking and screening of
offensive
material”—Congress
sought
to
“remove
disincentives” to the “blocking and filtering” of “objectionable
or inappropriate online material.” 148 It did so by extending
“Good Samaritan” protection for “blocking and screening of
offensive material” and by mandating interactive computer
services to notify parents about the options to “limiting
access to material that is harmful to minors.” 149
“Information” only appears in subsection (c)(1); “material”
only appears in subsection (c)(2). This indicates that when
the internet operates as intended—when it becomes the
“extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources” it is meant to be, and there is no
need to clean away anything offensive—then (c)(1) applies. 150
But when the uglier parts of the internet rear their head, and
an internet entity is forced to clear away such “offensive
material,” you are sure that they are protected in doing so
because (c)(2) applies. Thus, this intratextual argument
supports the plain reading that the distinction between
subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) is whether the internet entity is
an active or passive conduit.
Fifth, the concept of “good faith” also indicates that
Section 230(c)(2) is what overrules Stratton Oakmont. In
passing Section 230(c)(2), Congress solved the moderator’s
dilemma by borrowing a concept from the Good Samaritan
laws. This is why Section 230(c) is expressly captioned
“Protection for Good Samaritan blocking and screening of
offensive materials.” 151 Every state legislature has passed a
Good Samaritan statute, which protects against a similar
148. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (emphasis added).
149. 47 U.S.C. § 230(d).
150. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (emphasis added).
151. The Fair Hous. And GTE courts have stressed the importance of the
caption. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Indeed, that Section 230 is
the Internet Good Samaritan statute extends throughout the uncontroverted
legislative history. See supra note 54.
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“dilemma” created by the common law. At common law, a
physician who volunteered to aid the victim of a roadside
accident might thereby assume a duty of care and become
subject to liability for injuries resulting from her failure to
help effectively. Similarly, under the common law, it was
assumed that internet entities who volunteered to moderate
objectionable content on the internet might assume a duty of
care for the content they did not moderate and thus become
subject to liability for injuries resulting from their failure to
moderate effectively. In response, state Good Samaritan
statutes shield those who make “good faith” efforts at
emergency care from tort liability. 152 Congress passed its
own Good Samaritan statute—Section 230—to solve the
moderator’s dilemma. 153 Section 230(c)(1) states the baseline
principle that there is no publisher liability for not
moderating content—just as there is no assumed liability for
not getting involved in an emergency. But if one does get
involved in cleaning up the internet, then Section 230(c)(2)
shields those who make “good faith” moderation efforts from
tort liability—just as Good Samaritan statutes shield those
who make “good faith” emergency care efforts from tort
liability. The fact that Section 230(c)(2) contains a “good
faith” clause and otherwise parallels the operative part of a
Good Samaritan law indicates that it is subsection (c)(2) that
is the operative part of the Section 230 “Computer Good
Samaritan” law. 154
Sixth, though “a law’s scope often differs from its
genesis,” Section 230(c)(2) did not stray far from its
genesis. 155 The enumerated terms of the statute—“obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, [and]
harassing”—parallel the types of content that PRODIGY—
152. See Veilleux, supra note 533, § 2, at 299–300.
153. See supra note 544 (reviewing statutory caption and uncontested
legislative history).
154. See supra note 54 (“Computer Good Samaritans”).
155. Chi. Laws.’ Comm. For Civ. Rts. Under L. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
671 (7th Cir. 2008).
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the internet service provider at issue in Stratton Oakmont—
in fact moderated. 156 For instance, PRODIGY removed notes
that “harass other members” and prohibited notes
“containing obscene, profane or sexually explicit
language.” 157 Stratton Oakmont held that restricting such
harassing or obscene material imputed liability to
PRODIGY; Section 230(c)(2) overruled that decision by
holding that an entity shall not “be held liable” for restricting
“harassing,” “obscene,” or “otherwise objectionable”
material. 158 The parallel enumerated terms indicate,
therefore, that Section 230(c)(2) overrides Stratton Oakmont.
For these reasons, subsection (c)(2) is the operative part
of the statute. 159 Zeran was incorrect in finding that
immunity inheres in subsection (c)(1).
B. Where Section 230 Does Not Apply
The first Section 230 inquiry is a threshold one: it
determines whether Section 230 applies at all.
By its terms, Section 230 protections apply to entities
that are intermediaries (i.e. “interactive computer services”),
not to publishers (“information content providers”). 160
Examples of “interactive computer services” are “systems
156. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (PRODIGY’s community guidelines
state, in part that posts “that harass other members or are deemed to be in bad
taste or grossly repugnant to community standards, or are deemed harmful to
maintaining a harmonious online community, will be removed when brought to
PRODIGY’s attention.”).
157. See Exhibit H, Prodigy Community Guidelines at 4–5, Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Lusby, No. 0031063/1994, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. filed Dec. 2, 1994)
(copy on file with author).
158. It stands to reason that the PRODIGY community guidelines are a “safe
harbor” for the materials contained in “otherwise objectionable,” see infra Part
II.D (discussing the scope of “otherwise objectionable”).
159. Courts continue to err. See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d
846, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The core policy of section 230(c)(1) . . . is to provide
‘[p]rotection for ‘‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.’”).
160. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1)-(2).
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operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.” 161 Imagine a library computer circa 1996.
Much like the library itself is a gateway into knowledge
created by others, so too library computers or other
“interactive computer services” are a gateway into
knowledge created by others. 162 In contrast, an “information
content provider” is one who is “responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development” of the material on the
internet. 163 The “information content provider” is creative
and active: its activities are the “creation or development of
information.” If the “interactive computer service” is the
library, then the “information content provider” is the author
and creator of the books in the library. The “information
content provider” creates the content to which the
“interactive computer service” provides a gateway. 164
In many ways, courts have correctly interpreted this
provision. First, courts have held that if an internet entity
acts as an “information content provider,” then Section 230
does not apply. 165 This conclusion is correct and mandated by
161. 47 U.S.C.§ 230(f)(1).
162. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(“CompuServe’s CIS product is in essence an electronic, for-profit library that
carries a vast number of publications and collects usage and membership fees
from its subscribers in return for access to the publications.”).
163. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (“The term ‘information content provider’ means any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.”).
164. See Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting FTC
v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009)) (“The prototypical
service qualifying for [CDA] immunity is an online messaging board (or bulletin
board) on which Internet subscribers post comments and respond to comments
posted by others.”).
165. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2008) (Section 230’s “grant of immunity applies only if the interactive
computer service provider is not also an ‘information content provider,’ defined
as someone who is ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of’ the offending content.”) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)); see also
FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2016) (“LeadClick is
not entitled to Section 230 immunity because it is an information content
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the text. 166 Second, courts have correctly held that this is a
contextual inquiry, not an inherent one: the same internet
entity can, at different times, be considered either an
“interactive computer service” or an “information content
provider” depending on the capacity in which the entity
acts. 167 This conclusion is supported by the text of Section
230(c)(1), which states that an “interactive computer service”
is not the publisher of information provided by “another
information content provider,” implying that the interactive
computer service can, at least at some points, be an
provider with respect to the deception at issue . . . .”); Jones v. Dirty World Ent.
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408–09 (“[A] website may be immune from
liability for some of the third-party content it publishes but be subject to liability
for the content that it is responsible for as a creator or developer.”); Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he scope of § 230 immunity turns on whether that person’s actions also make
it an ‘information content provider.’”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under the statutory scheme, an ‘interactive
computer service’ qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also function as an
‘information content provider’ for the portion of the statement or publication at
issue.”).
166. Zeran thus erred in not addressing the definitions section, but instead
provided its own definitions. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330
(4th Cir. 1997) (Functionally defining the actions of an “interactive computer
service” as a “publisher,” which means “deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content”). Zeran also got the causal arrow backwards: instead
of not treating an “interactive computer service” as a publisher and thus limiting
the statute to the activities of an “interactive computer service,” Zeran assumed
that all publisher functions on the internet are protected. The statute does not
bear that meaning.
167. Fair Hous., 521 F.3d at 1162 (“A website operator can be both a service
provider and a content provider: If it passively displays content that is created
entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to that
content. But as to content that it creates itself, or is ‘responsible, in whole or in
part’ for creating or developing, the website is also a content provider.”); Batzel
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The reference to ‘another
information content provider’ . . . distinguishes the circumstance in which the
interactive computer service itself meets the definition of ‘information content
provider’ with respect to the information in question.”); Jones, 755 F.3d at 409
(“[A] website may be immune from liability for some of the third-party content it
publishes but be subject to liability for the content that it is responsible for as a
creator or developer.”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (“Under the statutory scheme,
an ‘interactive computer service’ qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also
function as an ‘information content provider’ for the portion of the statement or
publication at issue.”) (emphasis added).
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information content provider. 168 Third, the dominant
doctrinal test to determine the meaning of “development” is
the “material contribution” test. It focuses on whether the
entity developed what is allegedly unlawful about the
content, distinguishing between actions “that are necessary
to the display of unwelcome and actionable content”—which
do not suffice to turn an entity into an “information content
provider”—“and, on the other hand, responsibility for what
makes the displayed content illegal or actionable”—which
does suffice to turn an entity into an “information content
provider.” 169 “Neutral tools” do not remove an entity from
Section 230 immunity. 170 The material contribution test is a
permissible construction of the statute. 171 The Supreme
Court assumes that Congress reads a proximate cause
requirement into the law. 172 The same can be said of
proximate responsibility. Otherwise, under a literal
interpretation of the terms, given the interconnectedness of
the economy, nearly every party could be “responsible . . . in
part” for the “development” of information. 173
In other ways, courts have misinterpreted this provision.
168. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
169. Jones, 755 F.3d at 413–14.
170. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1271 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (“Those algorithms are ‘neutral means’ that do not distinguish between
legitimate and scam locksmiths in the translation process.”).
171. Fair Hous., 521 F.3d at 1167.
172. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.
118, 132 (2014) (“[W]e generally presume that a statutory cause of action is
limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the
statute.”); see In re Am. Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig., 19 F.4th
127, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2021) (reviewing the “first step” principle in many areas of
law).
173. Textualism is not literalism. Strict constructionism is “a degraded form of
textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute.” Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997);
see also id. at 24 (“[T]he good textualist is not a literalist.”); Amy Coney Barrett,
Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis: Redux, 70 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 855, 857–59 (2020) (criticizing literalism).
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Specifically, ex ante decisions to publish material makes an
entity an information content provider, a point that courts
have missed. Consider that an information content provider
is one who is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation” of information. This includes ex ante decisions to
publish on the internet, because that is the “creation” of the
information for the sake of the internet. The ordinary
meaning of a text includes not only its semantic content—
that is, “the meaning of the words and phrases as combined
by the rules of syntax and grammar”—but also its “pragmatic
enrichment,” or “the contribution that context makes to
meaning.” 174 Thus, the “full communicative content” results
from both the semantic and the pragmatic meaning. 175 As a
pragmatic matter, sometimes “what is said implicitly
includes something else that is closely related. For example,
if I say ‘Jack and Jill are married,’ this frequently
communicates some additional information, which could
have been stated explicitly as follows: ‘Jack and Jill are
married [to each other].’” 176 Here, when the statute states
that information is “creat[ed],” the implication is that the
material is “created” on the internet, which is done by
deciding to publish it. 177
Courts applying this interpretation have created absurd
results. By holding that ex ante publication decisions are not
protected under the statute, one can never sue the author
because the author would be the “user” of an interactive
computer service. This is clearly not the statute’s intent.
174. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 488 (2013).
175. Id.
176. Lawrence B. Solum, Contractual Communication, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 23,
28 (2019) (describing “impliciture”).
177. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (implicitly making a
similar argument insofar as that “provided” indicates that the material must be
provided “for use on the internet,” not simply “provided” in general); see Barrett,
Assorted Canards, supra note 173, at 859 (“[T]extualism isn’t a mechanical
exercise, but rather one involving a sophisticated understanding of language as
it’s actually used in context.”).
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After all, the cold comfort to many spurned plaintiffs is that
they can sue the publisher of the defamatory message, as
Zeran and other courts mention. 178 Yet courts have created
precisely this holding, which is opposed to both the text and
spirit of the statute.
Consider the case of Batzel v. Smith. 179 In that case,
“sometime-handyman Robert Smith was working for Ellen
Batzel, an attorney licensed to practice in California and
North Carolina, at Batzel’s house in the North Carolina
mountains.” 180 Smith, apparently, was also a sometimedetective. “Smith recounted that while he was repairing
Batzel’s truck, Batzel told him that she was ‘the
granddaughter of one of Adolf Hitler’s right-hand men.’” 181
“Smith also maintained that as he was painting the walls of
Batzel’s sitting room he overheard Batzel tell her roommate
that she was related to Nazi politician Heinrich Himmler.” 182
“According to Smith, Batzel told him on another occasion
that some of the paintings hanging in her house were
inherited.” 183 To Smith the sometime-detective, “these
paintings looked old and European.” 184 Assembling these
clues, Smith assumed that Batzel owned “paintings were
looted during WWII and are the rightful legacy of the Jewish
people.” 185 Smith emailed his unsubstantiated hunches to

178. Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Parties
complaining that they were harmed by a Web site’s publication of user-generated
content have recourse; they may sue the third-party user who generated the
content, but not the interactive computer service that enabled them to publish
the content online.”); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts
defamatory messages would escape accountability.”).
179. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
180. Id. at 1020.
181. Id. at 1020–21.
182. Id. at 1021.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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“the Museum Security Network,” which “maintains both a
website and an electronic e-mailed newsletter about museum
security and stolen art.” 186 Tom Cremers, the operator of the
Network, “published Smith’s e-mail message to the Network
. . . on the Network listserv” and “also posted that listserv,
with Smith’s message included, on the Network’s website.” 187
The Ninth Circuit incredibly held that Cremers, who made
an ex ante publication decision, was not an “information
content provider.” 188 This is an untenable interpretation of
the statute, and is a direct result of the Zeran approach of
protecting publication activities.
C. Section 230(c)(1)
Section 230(c)(1) reads:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider. 189

As mentioned above, courts have erroneously viewed
subsection (c)(1) as the central part of the statute. However,
the plain words of Section 230(c)(1) and an analysis of the
statutory structure both indicate that Section 230(c)(1) does
not create independent legal immunity but rather reaffirms
the common law rule against distributor liability. The
common law rule stated that an intermediary is not
considered a publisher. 190 That is precisely the same rule
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1022.
188. Id. at 1031 (“Cremers cannot be considered the content provider of Smith’s
e-mail for purposes of § 230.”).
189. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (AM. L. INST. 1977); Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (“[D]istributors such as book stores and libraries may be
liable for defamatory statements of others only if they knew or had reason to
know of the defamatory statement at issue.”); Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“New York courts have long held that
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that Section 230(c)(1) states: that the intermediary
(“interactive computer service”) shall not “be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information” that the authors
(“information content provider”) write, produce, create, or
develop. 191 Section 230(c)(1) does not grant immunity; it is
rather “definitional.” 192 It does not contain any independent
legal obligations, but rather piggybacks on distributor
liability and reaffirms the common law. 193
To say Section 230(c)(1) isn’t central is not to say it is
useless. Section 230(c)(1) updates the terminology (not the
rule) of the common law for the computer age. Audiences in
2022 might consider the terms “interactive computer service”
and “information content provider” quaint. But in 1996, the
updating of terminology was useful and novel: not many
judges or scholars had given thought to this issue, and it was
useful to put the common-law rule in technology terms so
that courts (who generally lag in the technological adoption
curve) could avoid confusion. 194 Section 230(c)(1) updated the
common law’s front-end interface, not the back-end code.
In this way, Section 230 is very close to a declaratory
statute. 195 This is not unusual. Many statutes “merely
vendors and distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither
know nor have reason to know of the defamation.”).
191. Judge Easterbrook made a similar suggestion in GTE. See Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (“On this reading, an entity would remain
a ‘provider or user’—and thus be eligible for the immunity under § 230(c)(2)—as
long as the information came from someone else; but it would become a ‘publisher
or speaker’ and lose the benefit of § 230(c)(2) if it created the objectionable
information.”). This is correct insofar as it concludes that the active-passive
distinction is the test of whether Section 230(c)(1) applies; it is incorrect insofar
as it assumes that an active entity loses the protections of Section 230(c)(2).
192. Id. at 660 (“Why not read § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather than
as an immunity from liability, and thus harmonize the text with the caption?”).
An excellent idea: it would not only “harmonize the text with the caption,” it
would harmonize the text with the text. Id.
193. See supra note 126 (analyzing Cubby).
194. After all, Stratton Oakmont and Cubby were the only two cases to deal
with this issue before Congress passed Section 230.
195. It is “definitional.” GTE, 347 F.3d at 660.
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reaffirm and reiterate the common law liability of a public
service corporation” rather than create new rights. 196 Indeed,
inasmuch as Section 230 is a federal tort statute, 197 the most
famous federal tort statute—the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)—likewise “did not create a new species of liability; it
merely adopted the standards of tort law as applied to
private individuals.” 198 The same has been stated regarding
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 199 the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 200 and other federal 201
and state statutes. 202
1. “Publisher or speaker”
There are two ways to interpret the provision “publisher
or speaker”: it can refer to the action (i.e., the legal cause of
action) or the activity (i.e., the nonlegal activity that gives
rise to a legal cause of action). If “publisher or speaker” refers
to the nature of the legal cause of action, then Section
230(c)(1) protects against publisher torts, like defamation
and false light, which rely on publisher liability, but would
not protect against distributor liability. If the focus, however,
is on the nature of the activity that gives rise to the cause of
action, Section 230(c)(1) protects from all “lawsuits seeking
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a

196. Cole v. Ariz. Edison Co., 53 Ariz. 141, 150 (Ariz. 1939).
197. See infra notes 203–38 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of
the word “publisher”).
198. Wetherill v. Geren, 616 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2010).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“Therefore, the Rule does not alter the common law requirements.”).
200. See, e.g., Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir.
1981) (OSHA “neither enlarges nor diminishes ‘common law or statutory rights,
duties, or liabilities.’”).
201. See, e.g., Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The Rules,
however, do not establish a separate duty or cause of action, and they are not an
independent font of liability.”) (internal quotations omitted).
202. See, e.g., Tubbs v. Nicol, 675 F. App’x. 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Under
Texas law, IIED is a ‘gap-filler’ tort [that was] never intended to supplant or
duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies.”).
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publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” 203
Starting with Zeran, courts have interpreted subsection
(c)(1)’s language of “publisher or speaker” to describe the
activity of publishing rather than causes of action based on
one’s role as a publisher. 204 This holding is necessary to
justify the conclusion that subsection (c)(1) carries the entire
immunity of Section 230. 205 In applying (c)(1) this way,
courts have dismissed, on Section 230 grounds, lawsuits on a
broad array of causes of action, including sex trafficking of
minors, 206 prostitution, 207 housing discrimination, 208
securities fraud and cyberstalking, 209 terrorism, 210
harassment, 211 intentional assault, 212 and the illegal sale of
guns. 213
The better reading of Section 230(c)(1) is the more
limited one protecting against publisher torts. 214 All the
203. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
204. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); FTC
v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016); City of Chicago v.
StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010); Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 139 (4th Cir. 2019); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354,
1359 (D.D.C. 2014); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2016).
205. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
206. Backpage, 817 F.3d at 22; see generally M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings,
LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011).
207. Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967–69 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
208. Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for Civ. Rts. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 669–72 (7th Cir. 2008).
209. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d at 418–22.
210. See generally Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871 (9th Cir. 2021); Force
v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp.
3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
211. Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 17-CV-932, 2017 WL 744605, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2017).
212. See generally Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (D.D.C. 2014).
213. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735, 2009 WL 1704355, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009).
214. This argument has been expertly made from a torts perspective by
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functions of a publisher mentioned by Zeran—”deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content” 215—would make subsection (c)(1) inapplicable. If an
entity was “deciding whether to publish,” Section 230 would
not apply at all—that kind of ex ante decision-making would
make an entity an information content provider and thus
Section 230 would not apply. 216 Ditto with the decision to
“alter content”—in that case, the entity would be an
information content provider because it would be
“responsible . . . in part” for the “development” of the
information. 217
Rather, the more natural reading is to give the term its
legal meaning. Textualism gives well-accepted legal terms
their “ordinary” legal meaning. 218 So when a text speaks of
being “treated” as a “publisher or speaker,” this refers to
legal treatment based on causes of action based on one’s
status as a publisher or speaker. In addition, the cause-ofaction reading of “publisher or speaker” also comports better
with the statutory words under the anti-surplusage canon: it
gives meaning to both “publisher” and “speaker” because
there are different causes of action that relate to speaker or
publisher liability. 219 The Zeran approach, in contrast,
Professors Zipursky and Goldberg. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C.
ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 330–37 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2020); Benjamin
C. Zipursky, The Monsanto Lecture: Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the
Good Samaritan, 51 Val. Univ. L. Rev. 1, 40–52 (2016). This Section aims to
forward arguments from a statutory interpretation perspective.
215. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
216. See supra Part II.B.
217. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
218. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129, at 73 (an interpreter must
consider the “specialized meaning” that the law gives to certain words, for
instance, the “presumption that person in legal instruments denotes a
corporation and other entity, not just a human being”) (emphasis in original). See
also United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94, 128 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (Menashi,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The ultimate objective is
to determine the meaning the law assigns to the text and therefore its legal
effect.”).
219. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129 (reviewing anti-surplusage canon).
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ignores the role of the word “speaker.” 220 Overall, this
conclusion is forced by its strained interpretation of Section
230. It must expand the meaning of “publisher or speaker”
beyond the natural meaning of referring to torts based on
one’s status as a “publisher or speaker” to refer to the act of
publishing.
Cases that rely on subsection (c)(1)’s “publisher or
speaker” clause to protect any publishing activity therefore
are incorrect. 221 This is not to say that these courts reached
the wrong conclusions. Entities have broader immunity
under Section 230(c)(2), which states without explicit
limitation that entities shall not be held liable (and the fact
that limitations are provided in Section 230(e) indicates that
Section 230(c)(2) alone does not have such limitations). But
such immunity does not come from Section 230(c)(1)’s
“publisher or speaker” provision, which covers only limited
causes of action. Courts are forced to stretch “publisher or
speaker” to cover all causes of action because, following
Zeran, they stuff all of Section 230(c) into subsection (c)(1)
rather than giving effect to the entire statute.
2. Distributor Liability
The fact that the intermediary immunity shifts from
subsection (c)(1) to subsection (c)(2)—and that subsection
(c)(1) can be properly interpreted to refer to publisher-based
torts rather than to causes of action based on the activity of
publishing—reopens a doctrinal issue that has been buried
for decades: whether Section 230(c)(1) covers distributor
220. Beyond this, the expansive reading of “publisher or speaker” is internally
inconsistent with the Zeran opinion itself, which viewed “publisher,” in one sense,
as indicating the ordinary, nonlegal meaning (for publisher liability) and also
super-specialized legal meaning (for distributor liability).
221. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 891 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The
Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ characterization of their claim as asserting a ‘duty not to
support terrorists’ overlooks that publication itself is the form of support Google
allegedly provided to ISIS.”); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir.
2019) (the “alleged conduct by Facebook falls within the heartland of what it
means to be the ‘publisher’ of information under Section 230(c)(1)”).
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liability. In the wake of Zeran’s dominance, few have claimed
that subsection (c)(1) includes distributor liability; after all,
Zeran extended immunity based on the activity of
publishing, which would include distributor liability as
well. 222 Though many judges and scholars have correctly
pointed out that this conclusion is not correct from the
perspective of tort law, it is also incorrect as a matter of
statutory interpretation. 223 Now that the brush is cleared
from subsection (c)(1), this conclusion can be seen more
clearly.
Zeran forwards two arguments in support of its
conclusion that Congress intended to remove interactive
computer services from defamation liability entirely. The
first was a textual argument. The Zeran court interpreted
“publisher” in reference to a hyperspecialized legal meaning:
under the republication rule in the law of torts, being a
publisher is “a necessary element in a defamation action,”
and “only one who publishes can be subject to this form of
tort liability.” 224 In other words, both a publisher and a
222. After Zeran, there have been no cases stating that distributor liability
attaches on the internet.
223. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(Zeran “ignored the complementary common law rule described in section 581(1)
of the Restatement, which is that “one who . . . transmits defamatory matter
published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has
reason to know of its defamatory character.”). Barrett cites dozens of law review
articles from the turn of the 21st century that discussed this issue. The fact that
there have been hardly any recent articles on this subject testifies to Zeran’s
dominance.
224. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997); see also id.
(“It is undoubtedly true that mere conduits, or distributors, are subject to a
different standard of liability. As explained above, distributors must at a
minimum have knowledge of the existence of a defamatory statement as a
prerequisite to liability. But this distinction signifies only that different
standards of liability may be applied within the larger publisher category,
depending on the specific type of publisher concerned.”). But see Malwarebytes,
Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 15–16 (2020) (“Congress
enacted § 230 just one year after Stratton Oakmont used the terms ‘publisher’
and ‘distributor,’ instead of ‘primary publisher’ and ‘secondary publisher.’ If, as
courts suggest, Stratton Oakmont was the legal backdrop on which Congress
legislated, one might expect Congress to use the same terms Stratton Oakmont
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distributor are both considered “publishers” in the law of
torts. 225 Second, Zeran forwarded an argument from
purpose. 226 The best way to conceptualize Zeran’s textual
argument is that “publisher” is a term of art with a
specialized legal meaning, and this specialized term of art
includes “distributor” liability. 227 This argument has
theoretical heft and persuasive force. After all, statutes are
a legal artifact, and they are written in the language of the
law. 228
But this argument fails for a few reasons. The clearest
counterargument is from text and structure. As the above
analysis shows, subsection (c)(1) limits liability based on
publisher-based torts and states that a distributor shall not
be treated as a “publisher or speaker.” The text means what
it says: there is no basis for reading in additional immunity.
The canon of inclusio unius (and common sense) indicates as
used.”) (citation omitted).
225. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332 (“To the extent that decisions like Stratton and
Cubby utilize the terms ‘publisher’ and ‘distributor’ separately, the decisions
correctly describe two different standards of liability. Stratton and Cubby do not,
however, suggest that distributors are not also a type of publisher for purposes
of defamation law.”).
226. Id. at 333 (“Liability upon notice would defeat the dual purposes advanced
by § 230 of the CDA,” because “liability upon notice reinforces service providers’
incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation. If computer service
providers were subject to distributor liability, they would face potential liability
each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement—from any
party, concerning any message. Each notification would require a careful yet
rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a
legal judgment concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an onthe-spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the continued
publication of that information. Although this might be feasible for the
traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive computer
services would create an impossible burden in the Internet context . . . . Because
the probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on
service provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230’s statutory
purposes,” the court concluded that it “will not assume that Congress intended to
leave liability upon notice intact.”) (citations omitted).
227. See id. at 331 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at
810 (W. Page Keeton, et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
228. See supra note 218.
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much 229: “when Congress said ‘publisher,’ it meant
‘publisher,’ and not distributor.” 230 It would be odd indeed to
read “publisher” as “publisher and distributor” when those
two entities are subject to significantly different liability
regimes. This is especially compelling given the comparison
between subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2). Congress knows how to
provide broader immunity, and explicitly does so in the very
next subsection. So “had Congress wanted to eliminate both
publisher and distributor liability, it could have simply
created a categorical immunity in § 230(c)(1): No provider
‘shall be held liable’ for information provided by a third
party.” 231 “After all, it used that exact categorical language
in the very next subsection,” Section 230(c)(2). 232 “Where
Congress uses a particular phrase in one subsection and a
different phrase in another, we ordinarily presume that the
difference is meaningful.” 233
Second, Zeran misapprehended the legal meaning at
hand. Even for those who say that the legal meaning of a text
should be primary, Congressional intent is still the
touchstone—Congress writes against the backdrop of the
common law and therefore the legal meaning is the meaning
Congress intended. Here, “publisher” had a well-accepted
legal meaning: it is a status under the law of torts that
stands in contrast to a “distributor.” And given that Section
230’s authors were reading Stratton Oakmont, not Prosser on
Torts, and that Stratton Oakmont used “publisher” as
opposed to “distributor,” the term “publisher” stands in
contrast to the term “distributor.” “Congress enacted § 230
229. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129, § 10, at 107–11 (“NegativeImplication Canon”).
230. David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61
ALB. L. REV. 147, 168–69 (1997).
231. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 16
(2020).
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
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just one year after Stratton Oakmont used the terms
‘publisher’ and ‘distributor,’ instead of ‘primary publisher’
and ‘secondary publisher.’ If, as courts suggest, Stratton
Oakmont was the legal backdrop on which Congress
legislated, one might expect Congress to use the same terms
Stratton Oakmont used.” 234 This interpretation hews closer
to Congressional intent (insofar as it parallels the terms in
Stratton Oakmont), but still adheres to the legal meaning of
the term.
Third, given that Congress imposed distributor liability
in the CDA, it would be “odd to hold, as courts have, that
Congress implicitly eliminated distributor liability in the
very Act in which Congress explicitly imposed it.” 235 Fourth,
this interpretation contrasts with Zeran’s approach of
interpreting “publisher” according to its ordinary meaning in
terms of exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content.” 236 The text cannot both refer to
the term’s ordinary meaning and to a hyperspecialized legal
meaning. For these reasons, the commentators, who have
overwhelmingly argued that Zeran was wrong to exclude
distributor liability, are correct. 237
In sum, the text does not contemplate a limitation on
distributor liability. By stating that a conduit should not be
treated as a “publisher,” under the canon of inclusio unius,
and common sense, the statute did not intend to remove
“distributor” liability.

234. Id. at 15–16 (citation omitted).
235. Id. at 15.
236. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
237. See supra note 223; see also Doe v. America Online, 783 So. 2d 1010, 1025
(Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (collecting commentaries).
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D. Section 230(c)(2)(A)
Section 230(c)(2)(A) states that:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected. 238

As discussed in Part II, subsection (c)(2) applies if an
entity takes action to moderate content, or otherwise
“restrict[s] access to or availability of” certain categories of
objectionable material, stating that such entities are not to
“be held liable” for the materials it did not moderate. 239 Some
voices today have called for internet companies to be held
liable as publishers of all content on their sites simply
because the companies moderate some content. 240 Such calls
are squarely rejected by the very core of Section 230(c)(2).
Within subsection (c)(2), subsection (c)(2)(A) applies when an
entity takes action itself; subsection (c)(2)(B) applies when
the entity provides the tools to others to take such action.
Each will be analyzed in turn, though for this Section,
“subsection (c)(2)” refers to subsection (c)(2)(A). 241
Section 230(c)(2) is highly protective. There are two ways
in which Section 230(c)(2) is broader than Section 230(c)(1).
First, unlike Section 230(c)(1), which is restricted to the

238. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Cornelius v. DeLuca, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1022 (D. Idaho 2010)
(“SI03 asserts that because Bodybuilding.com appointed moderators on the
Forum, and allowed the moderators to censor the content of the Forum,
Bodybuilding.com is a speaker or publisher for every objectionable statement.”).
241. This is because § 230(c)(2)(B) refers to § 230(c)(2)(A), and because most
cases would fall into § 230(c)(2)(A).
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treatment of an intermediary as a “publisher or speaker,” 242
Section 230(c)(2) contains no such limiting language, but
rather states that the interactive computer service shall not
“be held liable.” 243 Though the precise contours of the scope
of this immunity are up for debate, Section 230(c)(2)’s
protections are broader than Section 230(c)(1). This more
expansive language would certainly protect against, say,
distributor liability.
Second, Section 230(c)(2) protects against “material,”
whereas Section 230(c)(1) protects against “information.” By
the plain meaning of the terms, “material” is broader than
“information.” “Material” would cover videos and images,
which have no informative content per se. “Information,”
rather, by its very terms, covers content that informs. This
would include the content of text, as well as information
contained within videos or displayed within images. By
protecting “material” beyond “information,” Section 230(c)(2)
sweeps more broadly than Section 230(c)(1).
However, just as Good Samaritan laws are not limitless,
Section 230(c)(2) is not limitless either. There are three clear
limitations on and three open questions regarding Section
230(c)(2)’s scope.
1. Section 230(c)(2) Immunity Only Attaches in the
Narrow Circumstances Outlined by Statute
Section 230(c)(2) protects technology companies only in
narrow and well-defined situations. It protects “any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 244 While the
enumerated list of categories are well-defined and familiar
legal categories, the term “otherwise objectionable” is
242. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
243. Id. § 230(c)(2).
244. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
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ambiguous.
There are two ways to read the catch-all term “otherwise
objectionable”: an “unconstrained” reading does not
constrain the catch-all phrase “otherwise objectionable” with
the preceding list of enumerated terms, but rather states
that a company enjoys Section 230(c)(2) immunity as long as
it legitimately “considers” the removed material
“objectionable.” 245 Alternatively, a “constrained” reading
states that the catch-all term “otherwise objectionable” in
this provision is constrained by the previously enumerated
terms and does not provide an unbounded license to remove
content for any reason.
Though there are a number of arguments for the
“unconstrained” reading, the “constrained” reading is the
better reading of the statute, because the “unconstrained”
reading conflicts with a number of principles of statutory
interpretation. 246
245. Cf. Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., Civil
No. 09-4567, 2010 WL 1799456, at *6 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (“Congress included
the phrase ‘or otherwise objectionable’ in its list of restrictable materials, and
nothing about the context before or after that phrase limits it to just patently
offensive items.”); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Del. 2007)
(§ 230 provides broad “immunity” for “editorial decisions regarding screening and
deletion”); Pallorium, Inc. v. Jared, No. G036124, 2007 WL 80955, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 11, 2007) (same); Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659, 667 (2012).
246. There are a number of arguments for the “unconstrained” reading. The
strongest argument is that the “constrained” approach does not even overrule
Stratton Oakmont because the material that PRODIGY moderated (including
hate speech) does not fall into any of the enumerated categories. See Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 at *2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (citing PRODIGY’s community guidelines). Hate speech,
however, is inappropriate for children, and therefore would fall within the
catchall phrase “otherwise objectionable.” In addition, one can claim that the
term “otherwise” is ambiguous: it can mean similarly or dissimilarly. If Congress
wanted to limit the catch-all terms to the preceding enumerated terms, it should
have used the term “similarly objectionable” instead of “otherwise objectionable.”
“Otherwise objectionable” indicates a desire to cover the field of what an entity
might consider objectionable. At best, the term “otherwise” is ambiguous (in the
narrow, linguistic sense) insofar as it can refer to two separate meanings.
Nonetheless, ambiguity alone, at best, negates an argument from plain meaning.
The arguments for the constrained approach do not rely solely on plain meaning;
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First, had Congress intended the “unconstrained”
reading, it would have simply used the term “objectionable”
without enumerating categories because the statute would
still apply to material that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, or harassing because any material
possessing those qualities would also be objectionable. The
presence of these more specific terms, therefore, shows that
Congress limited the scope of “otherwise objectionable” by
inserting the preceding terms.
Second, the canon of meaningful variation and a
comparison with subsection (c)(1) supports the constrained
reading. Section 230(c)(1) protects those who distribute “any”
information. 247 Section 230(c)(2) protects the moderation of
material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 248 Congress
knows how to write expansively: it did so in Section 230(c)(1).
The fact that Congress limited the material discussed in the
statute indicates that Section 230(c)(2) is meant to have a
narrower, limited construction.
Third, the canon against superfluity states that “a court
should give effect, if possible, to every clause or word of a
statute.” 249 The “unconstrained” reading offends this canon:
it renders superfluous not just one enumerated category, but
every enumerated category. It deletes “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing” from the
statute. This is not the best reading of the statute. The
presence of terms indicate they have meaning. 250 “These
words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been
used.” 251
therefore, this potential ambiguity does not dampen their persuasive force.
247. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
248. Id. § 230(c)(2).
249. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 104 (1990).
250. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 545–46 (2015) (“Had Congress
intended the latter ‘all encompassing’ meaning, we observed, ‘it is hard to see
why it would have needed to include the examples at all.’”).
251. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
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Fourth, the canon of ejusdem generis instructs that we
interpret catch-all terms in light of the common
denominators that connect the preceding statutory terms.
“[W]hen a statute sets out a series of specific items ending
with a general term, that general term is confined to covering
subjects comparable to the specifics it follows.” 252 Ejusdem
generis applies here: we should not interpret the catch-all
term “otherwise objectionable” in isolation. 253 Rather, its
meaning is moored to the preceding terms.
Last, the next subsection—(c)(2)(B)—indicates that
Congress thought that the list could not be boiled down to
the term “objectionable.” In that subsection, Congress writes
that an interactive computer service will not be liable for
“any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (A).” 254 So when
362, 404 (2000) (The rule against superfluity dictates that courts “give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”).
252. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008); see also Cir.
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (holding that the phrase
“any other class of workers engaged in . . . commerce” is limited by preceding
references to “seamen” and “railroad employees”) (“[w]here general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.”) (internal quotations omitted); Yates, 574 U.S. at 546
(“Had Congress intended ‘tangible object’ in § 1519 [which refers to ‘any record,
document, or tangible object’] to be interpreted so generically as to capture
physical objects as dissimilar as documents and fish, Congress would have had
no reason to refer specifically to ‘record’ or ‘document.’”).
253. Ejusdem generis and the anti-surplusage canon often work in tandem. See
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 295 (2011) (“We
typically use ejusdem generis to ensure that a general word will not render
specific words meaningless.”); Yates, 574 U.S. at 546 (“The Government’s
unbounded reading of ‘tangible object’ would render those words misleading
surplusage.”); Cir. City Stores, 532 U.S. at 114 (“[T]here would be no need for
Congress to use the phrases ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’ if those same
classes of workers were subsumed within the meaning of the . . . residual
clause.”); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“If . . . the term ‘assessment,’
by itself, signified ‘[t]he entire plan or scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing,’
. . . the TIA would not need the words ‘levy’ or ‘collection’; the term ‘assessment,’
alone, would do all the necessary work.”).
254. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).
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Congress does refer to the categories enumerated in
subsection (c)(2)(A) but does so with brevity, it does not refer
to them by stating the catch-all term “objectionable” but
rather makes a conscious cross-reference. This indicates that
Congress thought that the enumerated list could not be
condensed to the term “objectionable.” 255
Courts have recognized this point—that content
removed for being “otherwise objectionable” must bear some
relationship to the categories Congress enumerated in
Section 230.
One may find an array of items objectionable; for
instance, a sports fan may find the auction of a rival team’s
jersey objectionable. However, Congress provided guidance
on the term “objectionable” by providing a list of seven
examples and a statement of the policy behind Section 230.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that “objectionable” content
must, at a minimum, involve or be similar to pornography,
graphic violence, obscenity, or harassment. 256
255. The “constrained” view also answers a question that has plagued the
Zeran approach. The Zeran approach cannot easily account for one of the stated
purposes of Section 230: “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws
to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means
of computer.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5). Congress has been forced to resort to
declaratory amendments such as SESTA and FOSTA to override some of the
more egregious post-Zeran decisions. However, § 230(b)(5) makes perfect sense
under the “constrained” approach: it limits, rather than extends, the protections
of Section 230 to entities that remove “obscenity.”
256. Nat’l Numismatic Certification, LLC v. eBay, Inc., No. 08-CV-42-Orl19GJK, 2008 WL 2704404, at *25 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2008). see also Song fi Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Given the list preceding
‘otherwise objectionable,’—’obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
[and] harassing . . .’—it is hard to imagine that the phrase includes, as YouTube
urges, the allegedly artificially inflated view count associated with ‘Luv ya.’”);
Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (declining
“to broadly interpret ‘otherwise objectionable’ material to include any or all
information or content”); Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-2738, 2008 WL
5245490, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (applying “the canon of ejusdem generis”
and concluding that Google’s “requirements relate to business norms of fair play
and transparency and are beyond the scope of § 230(c)(2)”); Google, Inc. v.
MyTriggers.com, Inc., No. 09CVH10-14836, 2011 WL 3850286, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. 2011) (“The examples preceding the phrase ‘otherwise objectionable’
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As “icing on a cake already frosted,” 257 Rep. Christopher
Cox (the co-author of Section 230) has explicitly endorsed the
constrained reading of “otherwise objectionable”:
The “otherwise objectionable” coda extends the half-dozen
specifically listed categories in subsection (c)(2) to include other
categories, pursuant to the well-established rule of statutory
interpretation (of ejusdem generis) that when general words follow
specific words in a law, the general words embrace things similar in
nature . . . . Nor is Section 230 immunity automatically provided on
account of moderation or curation policies that restrict access to or
availability of content on the basis of political viewpoint. Only if the
moderated content falls within the ambit of Section 230(c)(2),
including the “specific categories or categories similar in nature,”
does immunity attach. 258

Therefore, internet entities are immune from suit if they
remove content that they consider “obscene,” “lewd,”
“lascivious,” “filthy,” “excessively violent,” “harassing,” or
“otherwise” similar to these “objectionable” categories. 259
Beyond that, the internet companies are not immune from
suit under subsection (c)(2). 260
clearly demonstrate the policy behind the enactment of the statute and provide
guidance as to what Congress intended to be ‘objectionable’ content.”); see also
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fisher,
J., concurring) (“[E]xtending immunity beyond the facts of this case could pose
serious problems if providers of blocking software were to be given free license to
unilaterally block the dissemination of material by content providers under the
literal terms of § 230(c)(2)(A).”) (emphasis in original).
257. Yates, 574 U.S. at 557 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
258. CHRISTOPHER COX, RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE
HONORABLE JOHN THUNE at 7 (last visited Aug. 2, 2022), https://netchoice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/2020-08-21-Chris-Cox-Responses-Majority-QFRs.pdf
(emphasis added). This is not conclusive evidence on its own, but rather is “icing
on a cake already frosted.” Yates, 574 U.S. at 557.
259. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
260. This rule would apply regardless of the substantive views expressed in the
removed content. Under the popular understanding of § 230, a technology
company would be immune from suit for removing religious content if it considers
the religion objectionable and for removing content related to sexual orientation
if it considers the sexual orientation objectionable. For example, eHarmony
initially allowed profiles only for heterosexual couples and excluded gay couples.
It extended its service to gay couples to settle civil rights lawsuits. See Neil Clark
Warren, eHarmony Founder, Says Gay Marriage “Damaged His Company,”
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The enumerated terms have clear legal meanings. The
first four adjectives in subsection (c)(2)—“obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy”—are terms that often appear together. 261
The term “excessively violent” does not appear elsewhere in
the U.S. Code, but the Communications Decency Act
regulated “violent” content. 262 “Harassing” refers to actions
that are impermissible insofar as they are inappropriately
targeted or directed at an individual: “harassment . . . is
directed toward an individual rather than toward the public
in general.” 263 Spam would naturally fall into “harassing”
HUFFINGTON POST (updated Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/neilclark-warren-eharmon_n_2694711; Rachel Gordon, EHarmony Settles Lawsuit
Over Gay Matchmaking, S.F. CHRONICLE (Jan. 27, 2010) (noting that eHarmony
“didn’t offer gay, lesbian and bisexual matchmaking services on its primary Web
site, eHarmony.com, until last spring”).
261. For instance, the string of terms is found in the federal criminal laws
outlawing the transportation of obscenity and in numerous state statutes. 18
U.S.C. §§ 1462(a)-(b) (outlawing the transportation of “any obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy” book or photograph); see also United States v. Limehouse,
285 U.S. 424, 425 (1932) (stating that “Section 211 of the Criminal Code [18
USCA § 334] declares unmailable ‘every obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and every
filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, print, or other publication of an
indecent character”). Similar strings are found in federal regulation of cable
programming. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (“Any cable service . . . shall not be provided . . .
if such cable service . . . is obscene, or is in conflict with community standards in
that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.”).
262. Subtitle B of the CDA was entitled “Violence.” Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 139. Section 551(b)(1) required a rating
system for “video programming that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent
material” to permit parents to be “informed before it is displayed to children.” Id.
at 140. The FCC then used this authority to require televisions to allow blocking
technology. See Amy Fitzgerald Ryan, Don’t Touch That V-Chip: A Constitutional
Defense of the Television Program Rating Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 87 GEO. L.J. 823, 825 (1999).
263. People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 330 (1970). See also Harassment, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Words, conduct, or action (usu. repeated or
persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes
substantial emotional distress”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 2022) (“A
person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when he or she intentionally
and repeatedly harasses another person . . . .”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258E,
§ 1 (West 2022) (defining “harassment”) (“[three] or more acts of willful and
malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause
fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property”); STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, REVISED
ARIZONA
JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
(CRIMINAL)
340
(5th
ed.
2019),
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material insofar as it is impermissibly targeted and
annoying.
But where are the boundaries of “otherwise
objectionable” under ejusdem generis? There are three clear
commonalities between the enumerated statutory terms in
Section 230(c)(2).
First, the enumerated categories of content are
categories of content. A well-developed body of law
distinguishes between content-based and viewpoint-based
regulation of speech. 264 The term “otherwise objectionable,”
following this list of categories, can at most refer to categories
https://www.azbar.org/media/jl5lzdpl/2019
-raji-criminal-5th-ed.pdf
(“‘Harassment’ means conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct
in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person”); CECILY FUHR, 86
THREATS AND UNLAWFUL COMMUNICATION § 51 (2022) (“To constitute a cause of
action under a civil antiharassment statute, there must be a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses such person, and which serves no legitimate purpose”); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 817.568(1)(c) (West 2022) (“‘Harass’ means to engage in conduct directed at a
specific person that is intended to cause substantial emotional distress to such
person and serves no legitimate purpose”); 5 B.E. WITKIN, TORTS § 766 (11th ed.
2017) (“‘[H]arassment’ [is] defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of
violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person
which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose”) (emphasis added in all instances).
“Harassing” appears in Title 47 as well. 47 U.S.C. § 223. Section 223 of Title 47
prohibits the making of “obscene or harassing” telecommunications. Id. These
harassing calls include “mak[ing] or caus[ing] the telephone of another
repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called
number” or “mak[ing] repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates
communication with a telecommunications device, during which conversation or
communication ensues, solely to harass any specific person.” Id. §§ 223(a)(1)(D)(E). Many States also outlaw “harassing” wire communications via telephone.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2916 (LexisNexis 2022); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 653m(b) (West 2022); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-804 (West 2022); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1172 (West 2022).
264. See, e.g., 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 3:8 (3d ed. 2021) (describing “the elemental distinction between content-based
regulation of speech and the narrower concept of ‘viewpoint discrimination’”); id.
§ 3:10 (“We permit some content discrimination because some content
discrimination is necessary to identify those classes of speech that modern First
Amendment jurisprudence singles out for special treatment, such as obscenity or
commercial speech. We do not normally permit viewpoint discrimination.”).
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of objectionable content rather than to viewpoints with which
the service provider might disagree. At the very least, the
context indicates that for a service provider to receive
immunity for restricting access to speech that is “otherwise
objectionable,” the objection must be based on the category of
speech rather than the viewpoint of the speech. 265
Second, as Eugene Volokh and Adam Candeub write, the
term “otherwise objectionable” is limited “to material that
was traditionally viewed as regulable in electronic
communications media—and was indeed regulated by the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, as part of which § 230
was enacted.” 266 Under this view:
“otherwise objectionable” might thus cover other materials
discussed elsewhere in the CDA, for instance anonymous threats
(§ 502), unwanted repeated communications (§ 502), nonlewd
nudity (§ 506), or speech aimed at “persuad[ing], induc[ing],
entic[ing], or coerc[ing]” minors into criminal sexual acts (§ 508). 267

This is a persuasive interpretation given the “whole act”
canon states that “plain meaning of the statute” is
ascertained by looking to “the language and design of the
statute as a whole.” 268 It therefore makes sense to look to the
265. Indeed, “the other CDA provision that facilitated parental control via
blocking and filtering technologies was the provision for violence and sex ratings
of television programs (§ 551), which expressly rejected attempts to restrict
‘objectionable’ political speech.” Adam Candeub & Eugene Volokh, Interpreting
47 U.S.C. § 230(C)(2), 1 J. OF FREE SPEECH 175, 184 (2021) (emphasis in original).
“Section 551 said that the FCC should ‘prescribe guidelines and recommended
procedures for the identification and rating of video programming that contains
sexual, violent, or other indecent material about which parents should be
informed before it is displayed to children: Provided, That nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to authorize any rating of video programming on
the basis of its political or religious content.’” Id. 184–85 (emphasis in original).
Congress would not have permitted discrimination based on “political or religious
content” in one section while explicitly prohibiting it in another.
266. Id. at 175.
267. Id. at 184. The last category would be precluded by the explicit provision
in (e)(1).
268. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining
the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory
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whole CDA as a source of meaning for the specific
enumerated terms and the catch-all provision of “otherwise
objectionable.”
Third, the terms preceding “otherwise objectionable”—
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing”—refer to types of content that are inappropriate
for or harmful to children because of their graphic or targeted
nature. 269 This common denominator is consistent with
“[t]he text and legislative history of the statute,” which
“shout to the rafters Congress’s focus on reducing children’s
access to adult material.” 270
The statute uses the word “objectionable” in declaring a
statutory purpose “to remove disincentives for the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 271
language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”).
See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129, § 24, at 167–69 (“Whole-Text
Canon”).
269. Protecting children from inappropriate content is a well-recognized
compelling government interest. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (noting that prior cases “recognize the obvious concern on
the part of parents . . . to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“We have recognized that there is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors.”). This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of
literature that is not obscene by adult standards.”); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (“[T]he government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’
and in supporting ‘parents’ claim to authority in their own household’ justif[y]
the regulation of otherwise protected expression.”) (quoting Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639–40 (1968)).
270. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (emphasis added). The statute also identifies a
purpose “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”
Id. § 230(b)(5). It is significant both that Congress codified these purposes and
used the statutory term “objectionable” in doing so. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 129, at 35 (a statute’s enumerated statement of purpose is relevant when
interpreting a text); Kevin M. Stack, The Enacted Purposes Canon, 105 IOWA L.
REV. 283, 285 (2019) (The Supreme Court “has long relied on enacted purposes to

2022]

READING SECTION 230

1301

Consistent with this purpose, Section 230 is captioned
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of
offensive material.” 272 These intratextual considerations
indicate that the statute protects service providers that aid
parents by blocking content that is “objectionable” because it
is vulgar or inappropriate. 273 In the words of one district
court, “[a] plain reading of the statute indicates protection is
intended only for the ‘blocking and screening of offensive
material.’” 274
Such an interpretation would also comport with the
intended purposes of the statute. As the Ninth Circuit wrote,
“[t]he primary goal of the Act was to control the exposure of
minors to indecent material” 275 and Section 230 was enacted
“to control the exposure of minors to indecent material” on
the Internet. 276 As Judge Katzmann wrote, “[t]he legislative
history illustrates that in passing § 230 Congress was
focused squarely on protecting minors from offensive online
material.” 277 The specific purpose of Section 230 was to
exclude interpretations inconsistent with those purposes.”); Jarrod Shobe,
Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 669, 712 (2019)
(“Enacted findings and purposes should be properly understood as part of the
statutory text, and they should be treated like other enacted text for purposes of
interpretation. A theory of interpretation that accounts for them is therefore
simply a more complete version of the whole act rule.”).
272. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (emphasis added).
273. The statute explains that Congress’s concern was restricting “children’s
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4),
and deterring “stalking” and “harassment by means of computer,” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(5). That Congress included harassing materials along with graphic
materials to accomplish this second purpose does not preclude the application of
ejusdem generis because graphic and predatory material both threaten children
and indicate the sort of indecent material that Congress deemed objectionable.
274. Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
275. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003).
276. Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009).
277. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 79 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995)
(statement of Rep. Christopher Cox) (“As the parent of two, I want to make sure
that my children have access to this future and that I do not have to worry about
what they might be running into on line. I would like to keep that out of my house
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overturn decisions, such as Stratton Oakmont, that created
disincentives for service providers to remove objectionable
content that was inappropriate for children. 278 Congress
removed that disincentive by providing that a service
provider cannot be held liable on account of its acting in good
faith to remove content that is inappropriate for children and
by “empowering parents to determine the content of
communications their children receive through interactive
computer services.” 279
One potential counterargument is that the statute
permits the provider to restrict material it “considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable,” which might permit
providers to censor material that it considers objectionable

and off my computer. . . . We can make sure that [the internet] operates more
quickly to solve our problem of keeping pornography away from our kids, keeping
offensive material away from our kids, and I am very excited about it.”); id.
(statement of Rep. Ronald Wyden) (“We are all against smut and pornography,
and, as the parents of two small computer-literate children, my wife and I have
seen our kids find their way into these chat rooms that make their middle-aged
parents cringe.”).
278. Such decisions held that when a provider exercised “editorial control” over
the content on its platform, it was acting as a “publisher” and was therefore liable
for content that remained on the platform. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)
(“By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes from its computer
bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste,’ for example,
PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute
editorial control. . . . PRODIGY has uniquely arrogated to itself the role of
determining what is proper for its members to post and read on its bulletin
boards. Based on the foregoing, this Court is compelled to conclude that for the
purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action, PRODIGY is a publisher rather than
a distributor.”) (internal citations omitted).
279. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific
purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other
similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or
speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material. The conferees believe that such decisions create serious
obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the
content of communications their children receive through interactive computer
services.”) (emphasis added).

2022]

READING SECTION 230

1303

even if the material is not objectively objectionable. 280
But “considers” merely expands the bullseye; it does not
move the target. Even though “considers” broadens what a
provider, in good faith, has a privilege to censor, the privilege
is limited to material that the service provider considers in
good faith to resemble the statutory categories. It would
permit a provider to limit speech it considers “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, [or] harassing.” 281 It
would not allow the provider to create new and different
categories. Nor would it privilege censorship based on
viewpoint rather than the type of content. 282
In sum, taken together, the text and history of Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act lead to three
conclusions about the scope of the phrase “otherwise
objectionable.”
First, Congress’s inclusion of the term alongside its
identification of types of content cannot be understood to
protect censorship on the basis of viewpoint. 283 Second,
“material that was traditionally viewed as regulable in
electronic communications media—and was indeed
regulated by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, as
part of which § 230 was enacted”—is considered
“objectionable.” 284 And third, the material can be
“objectionable” in the sense expressed by the preceding
280. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis added).
281. Id.
282. To say otherwise would be to permit a Humpty-Dumpty approach to legal
interpretation, where parties are permitted to imbue words with their favored
idiosyncratic meanings. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH
THE LOOKING-GLASS 198 (Julian Messner ed., 1982) (1871) (“‘When I use a word,’
Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to
mean—neither more nor less.’”).
283. This is no surprise, given that one of the enacted “findings” in Section 230
was that “[t]he Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for
a true diversity of political discourse.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). Congress would not
laud viewpoint diversity in one section while, in the next section, permit internet
entities to squelch it.
284. Candeub & Volokh, supra note 265, at 175.
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terms: that it is not “family-friendly.” 285
The phrase “otherwise objectionable” extends the scope
of Section 230 protection beyond the specific terms that
precede it. One might debate, for example, whether Section
230 extends to the removal of material that is inappropriate
for children because it is vulgar in a way that is unrelated to
sex, violence, or harassment. But “otherwise objectionable”
must be moored to the preceding terms and the statutory
purpose codified in Section 230(b).
2. Section 230(c)(2) Only Applies to “Good Faith” Efforts
to Moderate
Second, Section 230(c)(2) immunity attaches only to
“good faith” efforts to moderate content. Three potential
meanings of “good faith” emerge: (1) no “bad faith” or illegal
efforts; (2) “good faith” belief that the content requires
moderation; and (3) “good faith” effort to moderate the
objectionable content. 286
First, entities are not protected for actively encouraging
illegal activity.
Though “good faith” is difficult to define, one meaning of
the term is clear: it excludes “bad faith” activities. And “bad
285. This answers one of the main criticisms that can be levied against the
“constrained” approach: that the “constrained” approach would not even overrule
Stratton Oakmont because it would not protect PRODIGY’s terms of service. But
interpreting “otherwise objectionable” as protecting decisions to remove material
that is not family-friendly would protect PRODIGY’s removal decisions.
286. This is an inexhaustive list. Courts have properly held that defendants
acted in bad faith by striking and censoring a plaintiff’s videos and channel,
where “videos ‘were in full compliance with YouTube’s Terms of Use and
Community Guidelines,’ and had appeared on Plaintiff’s accounts for months or
even years without Defendants raising any concerns about their content”;
“Plaintiff sought guidance from Defendants regarding how to comply with their
expectations and interpretation of the Terms of Use, but Defendants refused to
assist”; and “Defendants refused to provide Plaintiff with a coherent explanation
as to why they were striking Plaintiff’s videos and terminating its accounts.”.
Enhanced Athlete Inc. v. Google LLC, 479 F. Supp. 3d 824, 831 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
“Good faith” is intentionally undefined as to include cases like these. However,
the three definitions above are certainly part of a subset of cases that fall outside
of “good faith.”
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faith” includes activities that actively encourage illegal
activity (rather than merely failing to limit illegal activity).
This use of “good faith” is consistent with other uses in the
U.S. Code, where the term is meant to exclude illegal
activity. 287
If an internet entity actively encourages illegal activity
on its platform, then its activities are not protected by
Section 230. For this reason, courts have held that “good
faith” does not protect anticompetitive behaviors. For
example, the Ninth Circuit held that “good faith” does not
protect “blocking and filtering decisions that are driven by
anticompetitive animus.” 288 Similarly, the Middle District of
Florida found that a removal decision “based upon anticompetitive motives” would not qualify as a “good faith”
decision. 289
The “good faith” limitation highlights the casualties of
the Zeran approach: by relying on subsection (c)(1) alone,
courts have read out the “good faith” requirement of Section
230. Thereby, many bad-faith actors now avail themselves of
Section 230 protections.
The notorious Backpage case should have been decided
under subsection (c)(2). If it had, the court would have held
that the statute does not protect “a website” that “facilitates
illegal conduct through its posting rules.” 290 In that case,
three victims of human trafficking sued the website
287. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 48(d)(2) (“Good-faith distribution”) (“This section
does not apply to the good-faith distribution of an animal crush video to—(A) a
law enforcement agency; or (B) a third party for the sole purpose of analysis to
determine if referral to a law enforcement agency is appropriate.”).
288. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040,
1050 (9th Cir. 2019). Though that decision improperly read the “good faith”
exception into subsection (c)(2)(B), where it notably does not exist.
289. e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274
(M.D. Fla. 2016). Ultimately, the court ruled that Google’s actions were protected
First Amendment speech. See e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 14cv-646, 2017 WL 2210029, *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“The First Amendment
protects Google’s actions and precludes all of e-ventures’ claims.”).
290. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016).
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Backpage, claiming that it “engaged in a course of conduct
designed to facilitate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their
victims on the website,” which “led to their victimization.” 291
The victims claimed that “Backpage selectively removed
certain postings made in the ‘Escorts’ section (such as
postings made by victim support organizations and law
enforcement ‘sting’ advertisements) and tailored its posting
requirements to make sex trafficking easier.” 292 Cabined by
the Zeran framework, the appellants were forced to argue
that Backpage did not act as a publisher of the ads. The court
disagreed. Its hands tied by precedent, the court held “that
claims that a website facilitates illegal conduct through its
posting rules necessarily treat the website as a publisher or
speaker of content provided by third parties and, thus, are
precluded by section 230(c)(1).” 293 However, had Backpage
been decided under subsection (c)(2)—as it should have
been—the “good faith” exception would have found that its
facilitation of “illegal conduct” would not have been subject
to Section 230 protection. 294
Beyond excluding illegal activity and deception, the
contours of the meaning of “good faith” are unclear. Congress
does not define the term in this statute. This is likely
intentional, as Congress wanted the term to apply to a broad
range of situations.
State-level Good Samaritan statutes can provide
guidance. Section 230 was clearly modeled on state-level
“Good Samaritan” statutes, and “good faith” is “a very
291. Id. at 16.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 22.
294. Id. In fact, such facilitation would also likely make Backpage an
“information content provider,” given that it is “responsible, in whole or in part,
for the . . . development” of the materials, so Section 230 wouldn’t apply at all.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f). Regardless, Backpage was superseded by FOSTA, which
clarified that Section 230 “was never intended to provide legal protection to
websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution.” Allow States and
Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA), Pub. L. No. 115164, 132 Stat. 1253.
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common requirement in Good Samaritan laws.” 295 “Thirtyeight states require a rescuer to act in good faith.” 296 It thus
makes sense to look at state Good Samaritan statutes for
guidance for interpreting Section 230. 297
From the comparison to state statutes, two additional
meanings of “good faith” emerge: a “good faith” opinion that
a situation is an emergency, and a “good faith” effort in
responding to that situation. In other words, “good faith”
applies both to the diagnosis of the situation and to the
response given that diagnosis. These meanings can be
imported to the context of content moderation: a moderator
must objectively believe that the content requires
moderation, and he must make a good faith effort to
moderate the objectionable content.
In Good Samaritan statutes, “good faith” often refers to
the accuracy of a responder’s belief that they are responding
to an emergency. For instance, only two states—
Pennsylvania and Hawaii—actually define “good faith” in
their Good Samaritan statutes. Pennsylvania defines “good
faith” as “a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the
situation is such that the rendering of care should not be
postponed until the patient is hospitalized.” 298 Similarly,
Hawaii defines “good faith” as “a reasonable opinion that the
immediacy of the situation is such that the rendering of care
should not be postponed.” 299
In other words, these definitions mean that one who
responds to an emergency must have a “reasonable opinion”

295. Eric A. Brandt, Good Samaritan Laws-The Legal Placebo: A Current
Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 318 (1983).
296. Id.
297. See Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Where, as here,
there is no extant body of federal common law in the area of law implicated by
the statute, we may use state law to inform our interpretation of the statutory
language.”).
298. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS STAT. ANN. § 8331 (West 2022).
299. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.5 (2022).
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that they are, in fact, responding to an emergency. 300 So the
would-be Good Samaritan who performs CPR on a snoring
citizen recumbent on a park bench likely does not have a
“good faith” basis to believe the citizen is having a heart
attack.
In addition, the term “reasonable”—used in both the
Pennsylvania and Hawaii statutes—plainly refers to an
objective standard (i.e., it’s judged by what a hypothetical
reasonable person would do) rather than a subjective
standard (i.e., what the responder actually thought). This
makes sense: the overzealous yet delusional would-be Good
Samaritan likely personally believes that there is an
emergency. Yet because these beliefs are objectionably
unreasonable, the law does not immunize his actions against
tort liability.
In the context of moderating objectionable content, this
meaning of good faith refers to the accuracy of a moderator’s
belief that they are, in fact, removing content that is
objectionable rather than unobjectionable. So, for instance, if
a website removes content that they deem “harassing”
(which must be impermissibly targeted) but in truth this
content simply is a general statement expressing a viewpoint
with which it disagrees, then the accuracy of that moderation
would not suffice for “good faith” because they do not have a
“good faith” belief that this information is indeed
“harassing.” Of course, the platform may have the right to
engage in viewpoint discrimination, but that right must
come from a different source—for instance, the contract
between the provider and its users. Section 230 does not
immunize the provider from suit for such inaccurate
apprehensions. 301
A third meaning of “good faith” is that it refers to a
300. See, e.g., Bryant v. Bakshandeh, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1241, 1247 (Ct. App.
1991) (“[W]hether Bakshandeh had a reasonable, good faith belief that he was
responding to an emergency situation.”).
301. See, e.g., Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
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standard of care, as in the common phrase “good faith effort.”
In Good Samaritan statutes, “good faith” is often the only
required standard of conduct. “In nine states the only
standard of care required of a physician rendering
emergency aid at the scene of an accident is that of good
faith.” 302 “This in effect gives a doctor immunity for any
aggravated misconduct short of intentional harm.” 303 “One
Nebraska statute has neither a minimal standard of conduct
requirement nor a good faith requirement; this gives the
rescuer a veritable license to act as he pleases.” 304
In other words, one must attempt to respond to a
situation with a “good faith” effort, the same way one cannot
respond to an emergency with recklessness or gross
negligence. “Displacing a neck fracture in an effort to do
rescue breathing might be malpractice in the emergency
room, but it is not bad faith on the roadside. Trying an
unnecessary tracheostomy just for the practice would be bad
faith.” 305 So if someone is having a heart attack, but the
doctor performs a tracheotomy, that would be a “bad faith”
effort.
A similar definition of “good faith” is used in the FTCA
context. The FTCA makes the United States liable “in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances.” 306 As the Supreme Court held in
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, under “hornbook tort
law . . . one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and
thereby induces reliance must perform his ‘good Samaritan’
task in a careful manner.” 307 This is “good faith” as in a “good
302. Brandt, supra note 295, at 320.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Professor Edward Richards, Good Samaritan Laws, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
MAP – BETA 5.7 (last updated Apr. 19, 2009), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map
/GoodSamaritanLaws.html.
306. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.

307. 350 U.S. 61, 64–65 (1955).
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faith effort.”
In the context of content moderation, this means that the
content moderation cannot be totally out of proportion to the
stated goals, either in being under- or over-inclusive. 308 If an
entity states that it restricts obscenity but permits clearly
pornographic material on its homepage, it is not taking a
“good faith” effort to limit such material because its efforts
are clearly underinclusive. Alternatively, if an entity states
that it restricts materials that are excessively violent, but
then restricts material that is unrelated to that goal (say, by
de-platforming the Girl Scouts of America), that would not
be a good-faith effort either because its efforts are clearly
over-inclusive.
3. Section 230 Applies When There is a Nexus Between
the Cause of Action and the Content Moderation
The phrase “on account of” indicates that there must be
a nexus between the cause of action and the content
moderation. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase
“on account of” to mean “because of,” thereby “requiring a
causal connection between the term that the phrase ‘on
account of’ modifies and the factor specified in the statute at
issue.” 309 In other words, the plaintiff must seek to hold the
defendant entity liable on account of its moderation decisions
based on a shortened version of the PRODIGY argument:
that the entity is liable for what it did not moderate because
it did moderate some content.
This means that Section 230(c)(2) immunity applies only
to cases where the entity would have otherwise been held
308. “Good faith” does not mean is that the decision is altruistic. This is why
courts have held that allegations that filtering decisions may have been
“motivated by profit” are insufficient to show “an absence of good faith” under
Section 230(c)(2). Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605,
609 (N.D. Ill. 2008)). This wouldn’t make sense: CompuServe and PRODIGY both
had commercial interests, yet the purpose of Section 230 was to protect such
interactive computer services.
309. Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 326 (2005).
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liable because of the moderation decisions. The moderation
must be essential to the alleged liability; it cannot be
incidental. An example of such a nexus appears in the
Stratton Oakmont case, where the court held (erroneously)
that the moderation made PRODIGY a publisher. But the
nexus appears often. 310 In fact, this nexus analysis is highly
similar to the “publisher” analysis courts currently perform
under subsection (c)(1).
However, the “nexus” requirement excludes protection in
several lawsuits. For instance, in products liability suits,
where the liability has nothing to do with the editing of the
content, Section 230(c)(2) would not apply. 311 A but-for test
can be helpful: when the lawsuit would proceed regardless of
whether the content was moderated, Section 230(c)(2) does
not apply; but when the lawsuit, in order to proceed, requires
that the content have been moderated, Section 230(c)(2) does
apply.
Consider the case of Lemmon v. Snap. In that case, “the
surviving parents of two boys who died in a tragic, highspeed car accident” sued Snap “alleging that it encouraged
their sons to drive at dangerous speeds and thus caused the
boys’ deaths through its negligent design of its smartphone
application Snapchat.” 312 The allegations surrounded the
310. See, e.g., Doe v. Twitter, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 3d 889, 930 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19,
2021) (“These flaws, in essence, seek to impose liability on Twitter based on how
well Twitter has designed its platform to prevent the posting of third-party
content containing child pornography and to remove that content after it is
posted.”).
311. Similarly, a local statute that deals with the product rather than the
content is not preempted. See, e.g., HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica,
918 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2019) (Because the Santa Monica ordinance did not
“proscribe, mandate, or even discuss the content of the [website] listings” and
required only that the website’s transactions involve licensed properties, Section
230 immunity did not apply). Failure to warn suits might also similarly proceed.
See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (The
“actual knowledge by Internet Brands from an outside source of information
about criminal activity” is not an allegation regarding “mishandling the removal
of third party content” or failing “to adequately regulate access to user content.”).
312. Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 2021).

1312

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

design of a “Speed Filter,” which “ enables Snapchat users to
‘record their real-life speed.’” 313 “Many of Snapchat’s users
suspect, if not actually ‘believe,’ that Snapchat will reward
them for ‘recording a 100-MPH or faster [s]nap’ using the
Speed Filter.” 314 According to plaintiffs, the Speed Filter was
“incentivizing young drivers to drive at dangerous speeds.” 315
The court permitted the suit to proceed, reaching the
right conclusion for the wrong reasons. The court held that
Snap is not protected under (c)(1) and “the Parents’ amended
complaint does not seek to hold Snap liable for its conduct as
a publisher or speaker.” 316 The court should have first
applied subsection (c)(2), not (c)(1), because Snap moderates
content. 317 It should have then determined whether the suit
seeks to hold Snap liable “on account of” its content
moderation decisions. A products liability lawsuit does not
rely on content moderation decisions. The but-for test makes
that clear: if Snap’s community guidelines were different or
did not exist, the lawsuit would proceed nonetheless. The
content moderation was not a but-for cause of the lawsuit;
therefore, the lawsuit did not seek to hold Snap liable “on
account of” its content moderation decisions and would be
permitted to proceed. 318

313. Id. at 1088.
314. Id. at 1089.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1092.
317. See Community Guidelines, SNAP, INC. (Updated: January 18, 2022),
https://snap.com/en-US/community-guidelines.
318. Similarly, Professor Dickinson proposes a content-moderation burden
test. See Gregory Dickinson, Rebooting Internet Immunity, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
347, 353 (2021). Such a test is already implicit in the statute.
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E. Section 230(c)(2)(B)
Though Section 230(c)(2)(A) is often ignored, 319 Section
230(c)(2)(B) is entirely ignored. 320 The only cases that quote
it are those dealing with virus protection software that give
users the ability to limit spam. 321
This is a mistake. Section 230(c)(2)(B) offers
intermediaries a potential loophole in Section 230: because it
does not have the “good faith” requirement of Section
230(c)(2)(A), decentralized methods of content moderation
can provide greater protection to internet entities. However,
all this depends on the difference between “access” and
“availability.”
Section 230(c)(2)(B) reads:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of . . . any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the technical means to
restrict access to material described in paragraph (A). 322

There is a strong argument that Section 230(c)(2)(B)
provides greater protection for internet entities than Section
230(c)(2)(A). While Section 230(c)(2)(B) is limited to the
“material” described in Section 230(c)(2)(A)—namely,
“material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable” 323—noticeably absent is Section

319. See, e.g., supra note 160.
320. See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir.
2009) (Section 230(c)(2)(B) “presents a different problem, and a statutory
provision with a different aim, from ones we have encountered before.”).
321. See, e.g, id. at 1170 (Kaspersky, a firm that “distributes software that
helps filter and block potentially malicious software,” “invoked the protection of
§ 230(c)(2)(B)”); Asurvio LP v. Malwarebytes, Inc., No. 18-cv-05409, 2020 WL
1478345, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (“Malwarebytes moves to dismiss the
SAC, asserting among other things that it is entitled to immunity under section
230(c)(2)(B)”).
322. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).
323. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
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230(c)(2)(A)’s “good faith” requirement. Several courts have
argued that this distinction is intentional, and therefore this
subsection applies even if the restriction of material was not
undertaken in “good faith.” 324 “By its own terms . . . Section
230(c)(2)(B) has no good faith requirement.” 325 This is
correct.
There are excellent reasons for this exception. First, it
would be unfair to hold interactive computer services liable
for the actions of “information content providers or others,”
where the interactive computer service does not have control
over the other parties’ activities. 326 Second, this
interpretation dovetails with Section 230’s express and
enacted purpose of user self-help. Section 230 aimed to
encourage the control of users (i.e., “information content
providers”) over the content they receive. The enacted
policies in Section 230(b) expressly mention two goals. First,
the goal of encouraging “technologies which maximize user
control” over information they receive on the internet.
Second, “removing disincentives” for “blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s

324. PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes, Inc., No. 18-CV-234, 2018
WL 2996897, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018); Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC
v. Malwarebytes Inc., No. 17-cv-02915, 2017 WL 5153698, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
11, 2019); Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC, v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV
788630, 2000 WL 34016435, at *10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000).
325. Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., No. C07-0807, 2007 WL 5189857, at
*4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2007), aff’d, 568 F.3d 1169.
326. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). An analogy can be made to the avoidance of
transfers made to subsequent transferees; the Bankruptcy statute has a lower
burden of proof for subsequent transferees than initial transferees because
surveillance costs increase as one proceeds further down the line. See, e.g.,
Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eur. Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 897 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“Section 550(b)(1) implements a system well known in commercial law, in which
a transferee of commercial paper or chattels acquires an interest to the extent he
purchased the items without knowledge of a defect in the chain. These recipients
receive protection because monitoring of earlier stages is impractical, and
exposing them to risk on account of earlier delicts would make commerce harder
to conduct. Benefits to the commercial economy, and not to the initial transferors
(who may be victims of fraud), justify this approach.”).
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access to objectionable or inappropriate online material. 327
One enacted finding was that interactive computer services
“offer users a great degree of control over the information
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater
control in the future as technology develops.” 328 It is no
surprise that Section 230 was initially titled the “Online
Family Empowerment Act,” as it aims to empower end users
to control what they see on the internet. 329 And Section
230(d) further illustrates the goal of user self-help by
mandating that interactive computer services notify
customers of “parental control protections (such as computer
hardware, software, or filtering services) . . . that may assist
the customer in limiting access to material that is harmful to
minors.” 330 All this shouts to the rafters that Section 230
prefers for users to be in control of the information they
receive. That policy is furthered by not reading a “good faith”
requirement into Section 230(c)(2)(B).
This implication—that Section 230(c)(2)(B) is not limited
by a “good faith” requirement—becomes even more relevant
as platforms turn to decentralized methods of content
moderation. Such decentralized methods—such as Twitter’s
BlueSky program, federated social networks (like Mastodon
and Diaspora), community-run moderation (like Slashdot,
Reddit, and Stack Overflow), peer-to-peer social networks
(like Scuttlebutt), and blockchain projects—operate without
centralized control. 331 Many have argued they are a superior
327. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
328. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2).
329. See Why Decentralisation Of Content Moderation Might Be The Best Way
To Protect Freedom Of Expression Online, ARTICLE 19 (March 30, 2020),
https://www.article19.org/resources/why-decentralisation-of-contentmoderation-might-be-the-best-way-to-protect-freedom-of-expression-online/.
330. 47 U.S.C. § 230(d).
331. Amy X. Zhang has written thoughtfully in this area. See generally Amy X.
Zhang,
REFEREED
CONFERENCE
AND
JOURNAL
ARTICLES,
https://homes.cs.washington.edu/~axz/publications.html. Jay Graber, the head of
Bluesky, has a fantastic presentation on the subject. See generally Jay Graber,
Ecosystem
Review,
(Jan.
2021),
https://ipfs.io/ipfs/Qm
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method of content moderation, given the success of
decentralized protocols in fixing email spam. Fortunately,
such efforts are directly in the core of Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s
protection: an interactive computer service like Twitter
would “enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access” to
material that the users, not the platform, considers
objectionable. 332 So long as an internet entity (1) outsources
content moderation to a decentralized protocol, program, or
community, (2) states that the decentralized program should
only moderate “material described in” Section 230(c)(2)(A);
and (3) has no control over the moderation, it will garner the
additional subsection (c)(2) immunity. 333
All this analysis, however, depends crucially on the
difference between “access” and “availability.” Note as well
that Section 230(c)(2)(B) refers only to restricting “access,”
rather than “availability,” whereas Section 230(c)(2)(A)
protects both the restriction of “access” and “availability.”
The anti-surplusage canon would indicate that each word be
given meaning. It is not readily apparent what the difference
between the two words is. One potential difference is that
“access” refers to restricting the user whereas “availability”
means restricting the material. “Access” in other parts of the
statute refers to limiting user access rather than material
availability; for instance, the statute speaks of limiting
“children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material” 334 or “limiting access to material that is harmful to
minors.” 335 In these cases, the material still exists, but
certain users are prevented from accessing it. Such a reading
of Section 230(c)(2)(B)—as limited to preventing user access
rather than limiting the availability of the material—would
dFrru4PyHzXGZztEPnYToBR3QovD7fkC1HSyty22LzfD.
332. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).
333. Id.
334. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
335. 47 U.S.C. § 230(d).
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also dovetail with the statutory purpose of protecting familyfriendly services like PRODIGY that limit children’s access
to objectionable materials.
That said, the anti-surplusage canon is at its nadir when
it is discussing the surplusage of individual words rather
than (as aforementioned) entire clauses or sections. 336 That
applies with special force here where the words “access” and
“availability” appear to be synonyms with no apparent
difference.
In sum, the commentators’ conclusion about Section
230’s “mission creep” is correct, but for the wrong reasons:
they miss that it is Section 230(c)(2), not Section 230(c)(1),
that overturns Stratton Oakmont. 337 Viewing intermediary
immunity as emanating from Section 230(c)(2) also leads to
significant limitations on this immunity.
III. IMPLICATIONS: DOCTRINE, POLITICS, SCHOLARSHIP
This Article’s findings have a number of implications for
doctrine, politics, and scholarship.

336. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2118, 2161–62 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES
(2014)) (“Judges say that we should not interpret statutes to be redundant. But
humans speak redundantly all the time, and it turns out that Congress may do
so as well. Congress might do so inadvertently. Or Congress might do so
intentionally in order to, in Shakespeare’s words, make ‘double sure.’ Either way,
statutes often have redundancies, whether unintended or intended. The antiredundancy canon nonetheless tells us to bend the statute to avoid redundancies,
at least to the extent we reasonably can. But if one statute says ‘No dogs in the
park’ and another one says ‘No animals in the park,’ I believe we should generally
assume that the drafter wanted no animals in the park and really wanted to
make sure that there were no dogs in the park. The anti-redundancy canon
instead would have judges try to find some meaning of “animals” that excludes
dogs and thereby avoids the redundancy. Such an exercise is little more than
policymaking and, in my view, often quite wrongheaded.”).
337. It is not correct, therefore, that “Congress grabbed a bazooka to swat the
Stratton-Oakmont fly.” Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2019)
(Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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A. Doctrine: Reorienting Section 230 Immunity
This Article has a number of doctrinal implications. Most
fundamentally, it changes the main doctrinal inquiry of
whether Section 230 immunity attaches. The current
question is whether the entity acted or is treated as a
publisher. 338 This is not the correct inquiry. 339 Rather, the
correct inquiry is, if Section 230 applies, whether the entity
moderated the content, and whether that type of content
moderation is privileged by the statute. The cases
interpreting Section 230 must therefore be revisited.
This Article also has a number of implications for
intermediaries who seek Section 230 protection. First, this
Article has implications for how internet entities conduct
content moderation. For internet entities to avail themselves
of the Section 230 protections they currently enjoy, they
must fall under the subsection (c)(2). This means that
entities must modify their community standards to align
with the categories of content enumerated by Congress;
otherwise, they will be potentially liable as distributors.
Further, internet entities will have an incentive to encourage
decentralized or user-oriented methods of content
moderation, which are currently underway but have
remained underdeveloped, to avoid the “good faith”
requirement of subsection (c)(2).
1. Unresolved Doctrinal Questions
This Article opens a number of unresolved doctrinal
questions.
First, in shifting the focus from subsection (c)(1) to (c)(2),
this Article opens the door to distributor liability. Many have
argued that Section 230 does not limit distributor liability.
This Article argues that this is correct—at least concerning
entities that do not attain subsection (c)(2) protections. This
338. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
339. See supra Parts II.B–II.E.
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requires a further investigation into the nature and liability
of online distributors, which is worthy of an article of its own.
Another open question is whether Section 230(c)(2)
protects only against common-law torts, or also protects
against other causes of action. For instance, if a website
removed all lewd posts of one certain ethnic minority, would
that be violative of the civil rights statutes? The statute is
unclear. There are arguments in favor of the more expansive
reading. 340 Yet there are counter-arguments in favor of a
narrower reading. 341 In this Article’s opinion, Section
340. First is the canon of meaningful difference. Notably, unlike Section
230(c)(1), which is restricted to the treatment of an intermediary as a “publisher
or speaker,” Section 230(c)(2) contains no such limiting language, but rather
states that the interactive computer service shall not “be held liable,” full stop.
The canon of meaningful difference would therefore state that Section 230(c)(2)
immunity is not limited to publisher liability, but rather covers a broad range of
causes of action. Second is the canon of inclusio unius. The specifications in
Section 230(e)—which state that Section 230(c) does not have any effect on
“criminal law,” “intellectual property law,” “communications privacy law,” or “sex
trafficking law”—indicate, via inclusio unius, that Section 230(c)(2) is meant to
protect from other kinds of law. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F.
Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004)
(rejecting argument that “§ 230 immunity does not apply to claims brought under
federal civil rights statutes” because Section 230 is “limited only by specific
statutory exclusions, none of which is applicable here.”).
341. Under this view, Section 230(c)(2) does not provide independent
protections for content moderation decisions if these content moderation
decisions violate the law, but only protects against causes of action based in
common-law torts. Consider the legal reasons one would be liable for
“restrict[ing] access to or availability of” objectionable “material”: one would be
held liable as a publisher for material that should have been, but was not,
censored. Therefore, the legal mechanism that Congress amended was publisher
liability only, and the mechanism did not plausibly affect other types of liability.
In addition, the enumerated categories could cut the other way. Congress already
indicated in Section 230 that the limitation on immunity was absolute, but rather
did not apply to criminal, trademark, or privacy law. And in writing these
provisions, Congress took a belt-and-suspenders approach: by specifying that
Section 230 did not limit certain types of laws, it did not mean to indicate that
anything else goes. Indeed, the further passing of FOSTA after Section 230 was
enacted indicates that Congress intended to limit Section 230 protections, and
Congress cannot be expected to state all the laws that Section 230 does not
influence. In addition, one could argue that Congress does not “hide elephants in
mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001) (Congress does not “alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme
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230(c)(2) immunity sweeps broadly. It’s clear that Section
230(c)(1) protects against being held as a “publisher or
speaker” for “information”-based torts. Section 230(c)(2)
could have easily incorporated this limitation, but it did not.
Rather, though Section 230(c)(2) applies in fewer
circumstances than Section 230(c)(1) (which sets a default
rule that applies to “any” information), when Section
230(c)(2) does apply, it is a formidable shield. That said,
there are conflicting textual indicators. Courts would need to
determine Section 230(c)(2)’s scope regarding the civil rights
laws’ applicability.
One final open question is whether Section 230(c)(2)
protects de-platforming, namely the removal of a user rather
than the removal of material. On the one hand, Section
230(c)(2) protects “any action.” “Read naturally, the word
‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” 342 “Congress did not add
any language limiting the breadth of that word.” 343 And so
we must read Section 230(c)(2) as referring to all types of
actions used to “restrict access to or availability of
material.” 344 Courts have nearly uniformly held as such. 345
On the other hand, Section 230 immunizes from suit actions
in vague terms or ancillary provisions.”). Immunity from the civil rights laws
would be quite an elephant to hide in a mousehole, especially given that there
was no discussion of such immunity. Rather, Section 230 was meant to protect
only against tort liability. Further, state Good Samaritan statutes are not
protections against civil rights violations. Similarly, Section 230—the internet
Good Samaritan statute—was meant to be a protection only against tort liability.
342. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (1976)).
343. Id.
344. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
345. See Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Online Account Terminations/Content
Removals and the Benefits of Internet Services Enforcing Their House Rules, 1 J.
OF FREE SPEECH L. 191, 191 (2021) (reviewing “a dataset of U.S. judicial opinions
involving Internet services’ user account terminations and content removals,”
and finding that “[t]he Internet services have prevailed in these lawsuits, which
confirms their legal freedom to enforce their private editorial policies (‘house
rules’).”); id. at 221–24 (Appendix B) (listing only five cases where account
termination claims have prevailed).
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“to restrict access to or availability of material,” and does not
protect providers’ actions to terminate users’ accounts. 346
Further, as to the argument that terminating a user from the
platform is just another way of restricting access to
objectionable material, there is a background legal principle
that says that silencing a speaker entirely is an unacceptable
way to regulate speech, even if the speech is regulable.
Rather, blocking an account resembles a prior restraint,
which is considered odious. 347
2. Changing the Doctrine
Even though the Zeran approach has swept the federal
appellate courts, there are several ways for the doctrine to
change.
First, the Supreme Court can address the meaning of
Section 230. For the first time in the over twenty-five years
that Section 230 has been on the books, the Supreme Court
has granted a petition for certiorari to a Section 230 case, as
Justice Thomas has urged. 348 The Supreme Court should
interpret the statute because the issue is of nationwide
importance, and therefore silence by the Supreme Court
prevents “percolation” in the lower courts because any
individual court is, justifiably, reluctant to break with many
other courts. 349 For instance, the Supreme Court of Texas
346. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis added).
347. Cf. Balkin, supra, note 5, at 2017–19 (“If end users are blocked, or their
speech is taken down, they do not get to speak until somebody in the
infrastructure company decides that they have permission . . . . In this way, our
twenty-first-century digital world has recreated the prior restraints of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, offering a twenty-first-century version of
administrative prior restraint.”).
348. Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333, 2022 WL 4651229 (U.S. Oct. 3,
2022); see Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13,
14 (2020); Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220,
1221 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“We will soon
have no choice but to address how our legal doctrines apply to highly
concentrated, privately owned information infrastructure such as digital
platforms.”).
349. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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“agree[d] that Justice Thomas’s recent writing [in
Malwarebytes] lays out a plausible reading of section 230’s
text,” yet did not address the issue because the meaning of
Section 230 “is a question the U.S. Supreme Court may soon
take up.” 350
Second, Congress has the option of passing a declaratory
or expository statute. This statute would essentially state
that Section 230 means what it meant in 1996, thus
overriding contrary interpretations. Such a declaratory
statute might have a higher chance of passing, considering
that it is not clear how it would shift costs or burdens.
Third, the FCC can interpret Section 230 through notice
and comment rulemaking. The FCC has the jurisdiction to
interpret Section 230. Section 230 was passed as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and inserted into the
Communications Act of 1934. 351 Section 201(b) of the
Communications Act empowers the FCC to “prescribe such
rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public
interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” 352 The
Supreme Court has confirmed that this provision grants FCC
the authority to promulgate rules to carry out the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 353 There is no reason why
350. In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 91 (Tex. 2021).
351. Section 230 was Section 509 of the Communications Decency Act, which
was Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Section 1(b) of that Act stated
that, unless otherwise provided, the 1996 Act’s provisions were to be inserted into
the Communications Act of 1934. Section 509 stated that “Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934 . . . is amended by adding at the end the following
new section: Section 230.” Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56, 137.
352. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
353. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999) (“We think
that the grant in § 201(b) means what it says: The FCC has rulemaking authority
to carry out the ‘provisions of this Act,” which include §§ 251 and 252, added by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290,
293 (2013) (“Section 201(b) of that Act empowers the Federal Communications
Commission . . . to ‘prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in
the public interest to carry out [its] provisions.’ Of course, that rulemaking
authority extends to the subsequently added portions of the Act.”) (internal
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Section 230 would be exempted from the rest of the 1996 Act.
Fourth, there is room for changing the doctrine through
litigation, even though scholars have argued that “a courtcentered approach to reforming Section 230 will not
suffice.” 354 Litigants can bring a case under subsection (c)(1)
and attempt to have a particularly sympathetic federal
circuit court review its precedent en banc. 355 Given that
every federal circuit has adopted the Zeran approach,
litigants can pick the circuit they believe will be most
sympathetic to their claims. Litigants can also sue in state
courts, which are not bound by the judgements of the federal
circuit courts. 356 If the highest court of a state disagrees with
the consensus view, it raises the likelihood that the Supreme
Court will accept a case.
In addition, litigants can sue under Section 230(c)(2),
which has been universally ignored by courts. Because most
courts have not addressed this subsection, federal courts will
be free to rule without being encumbered by contrary
precedent. 357
An indicator that this approach might lead to victories
for plaintiffs is the case of Domen v. Vimeo—and its curious
history in the Second Circuit. Vimeo operates a YouTube-like
citations omitted).
354. Sylvain, Platform Realism, supra note 99, at 477.
355. En banc review is necessary because statutory precedents receive a
“super-strong presumption of correctness,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. J. 1361, 1362 (1988), because courts
expect Congress to pass an expository statute if the Courts are wrong in a way
they do not expect a constitutional amendment to pass. But see Amy Coney
Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
317, 327–51 (2005) (criticizing this practice at the circuit level).
356. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 n.21 (1997)
(noting that “the stare decisis effect of [a federal district] court’s ruling was
distinctly limited” because it was “not binding on the Arizona state courts.”);
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[N]either federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that
a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s
interpretation.”).
357. See, e.g., supra note 142.
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online video platform. Jim Domen, the president of a group
called Church United, uploaded five videos to Vimeo’s
platform. These videos spoke to the plausibility of sexual
orientation change efforts (SOCE). Vimeo “instructed Domen
to remove the videos” because “Vimeo does not allow videos
that promote [SOCE]” because “Vimeo does not allow videos
that harass, incite hatred, or include discriminatory or
defamatory speech.” 358 If Domen did not remove the videos,
Vimeo warned, “Vimeo might remove the videos or the entire
account.” 359 Domen did not remove the videos. Vimeo
removed the videos and deleted Domen’s account.
Domen sued, claiming that though Vimeo adhered to its
terms of service, Vimeo’s terms of service violated state antidiscrimination laws because Vimeo discriminated against
Domen on the basis of religion and sexual orientation. Vimeo
cited Section 230 to bar an inquiry on the merits given that
“Section 230 immunity, like other forms of immunity, is
generally accorded effect at the first logical point in the
litigation process.” 360
The Second Circuit issued three separate opinions. On
March 11, 2021, a panel of the Second Circuit agreed with
Vimeo, writing that so long as the provider “consider[s]” the
content “objectionable,” the internet provider can remove
content without having to respond to allegations that in
doing so the provider illegally discriminated against a user
or violated its own contractual obligations. 361 Then, on July
15, 2021, the panel granted the petition for rehearing and
withdrew its opinion. 362 On July 21, 2021, it issued a new
opinion. 363 But this opinion was odd. Fundamentally, it still
358. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2021) (Domen I).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 73 (“Section 230 immunity . . . is an immunity from suit rather than
a mere defense to liability”).
361. Id. at 72.
362. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 2 F.4th 1002 (2d Cir. 2021).
363. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 6 F.4th 245 (2d. Cir. 2021) (Domen II).
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reached the same outcome, but instead of reaching this
result through “otherwise objectionable,” it mystifyingly
chose “harassing” as its textual hook. In other words, the
panel held that because Vimeo considered Domen’s videos
“harassing,” Vimeo comes under the protection of
Section 230(c)(2). 364 It is plainly implausible for Domen’s
videos to be considered “harassing”: given the wellestablished meaning of “harassing” as describing
impermissibly targeted conduct, videos aimed at a general
audience and not at a specific person or specific group cannot
be considered “harassing.” 365 Perhaps recognizing this, on
September 23, 2021, the panel withdrew this second
opinion. 366 Finally, on September 24, 2021, the Second
Circuit panel released a third opinion, not ruling on the
Section 230 claims but rather on 12(b)(6) stating that Domen
failed to state a claim. 367
This story shows that a panel of the Second Circuit was
not confident that the “unconstrained” reading was correct.
Whether they came to this conclusion through introspection
and being convinced by further and persuasive briefing, or
whether they were concerned about being overruled (either
by the Second Circuit sitting en banc or by the Supreme
Court), is a matter we may never discover. But what it does
show is that Section 230(c)(2) arguments are strong enough
to convince a panel of the Second Circuit to withdraw an
opinion, not once but twice, indicating that these arguments
might find purchase.

364. Id. at 252.
365. A generally-available video speaking in general terms of matters of
general concern is not “harassing.” “Harassing” has a well-established meaning:
it refers to actions that are impermissible insofar as they are inappropriately
targeted or directed at an individual. See supra note 263.
366. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 20-616-cv, 2021 WL 4399692, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept.
23, 2021).
367. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., No. 20-616-cv, 2021 WL 4352312, at *4 (2d Cir.
Sept. 24, 2021) (Domen III) (“Appellants’ complaint fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.”).
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B. Politics: Section 230 Is Already Reformed
This Article has a number of implications for political
reforms: the substance of many reforms is already contained
in the statute, which makes certain reforms unnecessary.
For instance, reforms to exclude “Bad Samaritans” who
act in bad faith are already included in the statute. Scholars,
commentators, citizens, and activists have objected to the
protections given to internet entities that are bad-faith
actors, insofar as they knowingly facilitate illegal or
objectionable activity. 368 Courts have ruled that Section 230
protects platforms that encourage such objectionable content
as cyber bullying or revenge porn. 369 Indeed, courts had held
that web platforms are not liable for enabling or encouraging
criminal conduct, such as human trafficking—even though
Section 230 clearly states that it should not impair the
enforcement of criminal law. 370 Many have therefore
368. Citron & Wittes, supra note 855, at 417 (Section 230 “immunity should
not apply to platforms designed to host illegality or sites that deliberately choose
to host illegal content.”); Citron & Franks, supra note 90, at 70 (“Another effective
and modest adjustment would involve amending Section 230 to exclude bad
actors from its legal shield.”); Holding Big Tech Accountable: Targeted Reforms
to Tech’s Legal Immunity, Before the U.S. H.R., Comm. on Energy & Com.,
Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech., 117th Cong. 16 (2021) (statement of Carrie
Goldberg, Founder, C.A. Goldberg, PLLC) (proposing “Bad Samaritan” carveout),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/fi
les/documents/Witness%20Testimony_Goldberg_2021.12.01.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., SECTION 230—NURTURING INNOVATION OR FOSTERING UNACCOUNTABILITY?
KEY
TAKEAWAYS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
14–15
(2020),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download. Rep. Bob Latta has proposed a
“Bad Samaritan carve out,” see Discussion Draft Bill, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021),
https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/5Latta-Sec-230-Illegal-Content.pdf.
369. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 173–75
(Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2014); Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks,
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 368 (2014).
370. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]hat a
website operates through a meretricious business model is not enough to strip
away those [Section 230] protections.”); see Kendra Albert, et al., FOSTA In Legal
Context, 52 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 1084, 1099 n.65 (2021) (“This was
emphasized in particular through the film I Am Jane Doe, which documented the
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suggested a “Bad Samaritan” carve-out where Section 230
does not protect those who encourage illegal activity. 371 But
because the operative part of Section 230 is subsection (c)(2),
the “good faith” requirement is operative whenever entities
moderate their own content. It would therefore exclude
entities that operate in bad faith. 372 This is a reform that is
proposed by scholars and legislators—but it is already
included in the statute.
In addition, reforms to exclude decisions to moderate
content based on political viewpoint from Section 230
protections are similarly unnecessary. Conservative
politicians have suggested reforms to punish intermediaries
for alleged anti-conservative bias. Towards the end of his
term, President Trump issued an Executive Order on
Preventing Online Censorship, which stated that “Section
230 was not intended to allow a handful of companies to grow
into titans controlling vital avenues for our national
discourse under the guise of promoting open forums for
debate, and then to provide those behemoths blanket
immunity when they use their power to censor content and
silence viewpoints that they dislike.” 373 Similarly, Senator
Josh Hawley has proposed a number of measures that aim
“to eradicate what several Republican politicians have called
‘anti-conservative bias’ allegedly embedded in tech
companies’
content
moderation
policies.” 374
Other
conservative politicians have proposed similar measures. 375
plaintiffs’ stories and highlighted the effect of § 230 in their cases. The film was
released in February 2017 and screened for Congress. FOSTA was drafted that
same year.”) (citing I AM JANE DOE (50 Eggs Films 2017)).
371. See supra note 368.
372. In addition, a Bad Samaritan would be “responsible” at least “in part” for
the “development” of information. See supra notes 290–294 and accompanying
text.
373. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,080 (June 2, 2020).
374. Lily Coad, Compelling Code: A First Amendment Argument Against
Requiring Political Neutrality in Online Content Moderation, 106 CORNELL L.
REV. 457, 466 (2021).
375. Press Release, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, E&C Republicans Announce
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Such moderation may be protected by the First Amendment
or by the entity’s terms of service. But, as described above,
they are not privileged by Section 230, as they do not fall
within the enumerated terms of subsection (c)(2)(A) and are
not sufficiently similar to these terms. 376 In addition, this
Article would state that the various state-level laws that
prohibit viewpoint discrimination are not preempted by
Section 230, though they might still face stiff First
Amendment challenges. 377
In addition, should Congress pass an amendment to
Section 230 beyond these two areas, it would be critically
important to not specify subsection (c)(1). The language of
many proposed reforms only amend subsection (c)(1)—after
all, this is the subsection that courts have implemented.
However, if this Article is correct that the operative
subsection is (c)(2), then these reforms would be ineffectual.
C. Scholarship: Interpretation & Inequality
This Article also contributes to the theory of statutory
interpretation by suggesting that the interaction between
interpretation and inequality is ripe for further research.
Next Phase of Their Effort to Hold Big Tech Accountable (July 28, 2021),
https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/news/press-release/ecrepublicans-announce-next-phase-of-their-effort-to-hold-big-tech-accountable/.
376. These decisions are most likely protected by the entity’s terms of service.
See supra notes 257, 263–264 and accompanying text.
377. See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 21-CV-840, 2021 WL 5755120, at *2 (W.D.
Tex. Dec. 1, 2021) (Texas HB 20 “is preempted under the supremacy clause by
the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.”); NetChoice, LLC v. Moody,
546 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1089–90 (N.D. Fla. 2021) (Florida SB 7072 preempted);
Chi. Laws.’ Comm. For Civ. Rts. Under L. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681,
697 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“And because it is something less than an absolute grant of
immunity, state legislatures may be able to enact, consistent with Section 230,
initiatives that induce or require online service providers to protect the interests
of third parties (under Zeran’s holding, states cannot enact such initiatives
because they would be inconsistent with the statute and thus preempted under
Section 230(e)(3)).”); Candeub & Volokh, supra note 265, at 189 (“[I]f states
choose to protect platform users against discrimination based on ideological
viewpoint, they could indeed limit platform power that way, without running
afoul of § 230(c)(2).”).
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One drawback of a dynamic interpretation is that it
might privilege parties who can muster the resources to pay
the expense of litigation and influence the judiciary. In other
words, to apply Marc Galanter’s seminal theory, originalism
is to be preferred because dynamism privileges the “haves”
over the “have-nots”: it favors more powerful repeat
defendants over one-shot plaintiffs. 378
The story of Section 230’s misinterpretation by the
judiciary bears out this hypothesis. Nearly every Section 230
case consists of one-shot plaintiffs—often with sympathetic
stories but few resources—fighting against wealthy and wellrepresented technology companies, who are repeat players
who litigate many such cases. It is an unequal playing field.
As such, the dynamic interpretations offered by judges
perhaps privileged the more powerful parties who were
better able to muster resources to craft narratives around the
impact of a given decision. 379 A focus on a text’s original
approach would not further exacerbate the existing
inequalities by adding a further opportunity for more
powerful parties to change the law in their favor.
If this is true, then even those who would not be disposed
towards originalism might be disposed towards adopting a
“sliding scale” of originalism based on the relative inequality
of the parties. More generally, it would advocate for more
constraint for judges in cases of inequality between the
parties, for instance, in antitrust or securities fraud cases
(two areas with both notoriously flexible standards and
inequality between the parties). Thus, this Article—and the
story of Section 230—illustrates that the interaction between
inequality and interpretative method is ripe for further
378. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 103 (1974).
379. As Professor Jeff Kosseff has shown, these decisions implicitly embody the
notion that the “internet is different” and that judicial decision-making must be
responsive to this social dynamic. See KOSSEFF, supra note 2, at 77–78 (Noting
these cases that applied Section 230 expansively were based on a notion that
“[t]he internet is different.”).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that Section 230 has been
consistently misinterpreted, and that a thorough reading of
the text, instead of relying solely on purpose and intention,
leads to a contrary—and superior—interpretation. It has
outlined the broad implications of this argument, and offered
some constructive paths forward to implement these
insights.
This analysis is highly timely. The Supreme Court is
poised to “consider whether the text of this increasingly
important statute aligns with the current state of immunity
enjoyed by Internet platforms.” 380 Hopefully, this Article will
help guide the Court and litigants in giving the proper
attention to the text of this ever-important statute.

380. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 14
(2020).

